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Online gambling is by its nature a cross-border activity. As 
gambling is generally considered a socially dangerous and 
somewhat disreputable form of entertainment, countries that 
are now Member States of the European Union have regulated 
gambling for centuries in order to protect various social 
interests and to generate tax revenues.2 Over the years, various 
                                                                                                             
1 . For the purpose of consistency, this Note adopts the Treaty of Lisbon 
numbering throughout, even when discussing cases decided under the Treaties of 
Rome or Amsterdam numbering. This Note also refers to the European Union and EU 
law when discussing cases decided before the European Union was formed, and refers 
to the Court of Justice of the European Union as the CJEU rather than the pre-Lisbon 
ECJ. The names of books or articles using pre-Lisbon terminology have not been 
changed. 
2. See, e.g., SPORTS BETTING: LAW AND POLICY 28–29 (Paul M. Anderson, Ian S. 
Blackshaw & Robert C.R. Siekmann eds., 2011) (discussing traditional conceptions of 
gambling as associated with fraud, crime, and moral disrepute); see also CRIME, 
ADDICTION AND THE REGULATION OF GAMBLING 1 (Cyrille Fijnaut, Alan Littler & Toine 
Spapens eds., 2008) (observing that national governments have regulated gambling for 
centuries based on dual arguments that it is best to channel the activity and that 
revenue ought to be directed towards the public interest); 8 AMBROSE BIERCE, THE 
COLLECTED WORKS OF AMBROSE BIERCE (1909-1912) (“The gambling known as 
business looks with austere disfavor upon the business known as gambling.”). Advocate 
General (“AG”) Dámaso Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer also explored gambling’s pervasive 
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European national governments have developed widely differing 
methods of regulating gambling. 3  The European Union, 
however, has sought to create a centralized system of gambling 
regulation that accommodates the free trade goals of the Treaty 
of Lisbon and the diverse policy objectives of the individual 
Member States. 4  One reasonably might argue that online 
gambling should be regulated at the EU level in order to assure 
the fundamental freedoms promised by the Internal Market. At 
the same time, while gambling is an economically significant 
industry, it implicates socially sensitive issues like the 
squandering of money, addiction to gambling, and organized 
crime.5 
The conflict between the economic objectives of the 
borderless, supra-national trading zone and the national social 
objectives that the gambling industry affects is evident in the 
Court of Justice of the European Union’s (the “CJEU”) 
preliminary rulings regarding the compatibility of national 
                                                                                                             
presence in literature in his Opinion citing works by Cervantes, Dostoevsky, 
Chateaubriand, and Kant. Joined Cases 338, 359 & 360/04, Opinion of Advocate 
General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Massimiliano Placanica and Others (“Placanica”), [2007] 
E.C.R. I-1894, ¶ 95 nn. 58–62. Each case before the CJEU is assigned an AG to research 
independently and deliver a non-binding opinion to the CJEU, and it is considered 
unusual for the CJEU to depart from the AG’s opinion. ANTHONY ARNULL, THE 
EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE 14–15 (2d. ed. 2006); see Consolidated 
Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 252 (ex art. 222 
TEC), 2012 O.J. C 326/47, at 207 [hereinafter TFEU]; id. art. 253 (ex art. 223 TEC), at 
208; TREVOR HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 49–50 (7th ed. 
2010) (describing AGs as independent representatives of the public like the French 
commissaire du gouvernement). 
3. See Commission of the European Communities, On On-line Gambling in the 
Internal Market: Green Paper from the Commission to the European Council, COM 
(2011) 128 final, at 3 (Mar. 24, 2011) [hereinafter Green Paper] (establishing there are 
generally two regulatory models applied in the EU Member States: one based on a 
controlled monopoly (often public) and the other based on licensed gambling 
providers operating within a controlled regulatory scheme). 
4. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2012 O.J. C 326/13 
[hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon]. 
5. See Steve Scherer, INSIGHT–Italian Gaming Liberalisation: A Bet That Did Not Pay 
Off, REUTERS (July 17, 2012, 6:01 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/17/
us-italy-gaming-idUSBRE86G0IJ20120717 (highlighting that 700,000 Italians are 
addicted to gambling and the mafia uses legal gambling to launder billions of euros); 
see also Tom Kingston, State and Mafia Take Their Cut As Italians Develop Gambling Habit, 
GUARDIAN, Feb. 29, 2012. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/29/state-
mafia-italy-gambling (describing how the economic crisis has driven many Italians to 
gamble). 
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gambling regulation with the objectives of the Internal Market. 6 
A logical question, then, is whether the deferential treatment 
granted to Member States in gambling regulation violates the 
fundamental freedoms of the Internal Market and the Treaty of 
Lisbon. The Treaty of Lisbon allows restrictions on the freedom 
to provide services, provided the regulations do not discriminate 
on the basis of nationality and are tailored to public policy, 
public security, or public health objectives. 7  The CJEU has 
recognized regulation of gambling to be a restriction on the 
provision of services but generally allows such regulation in 
deference to the Member States’ social policy objectives.8 Due to 
political and social sensitivity, adoption of legislation by the 
tricameral EU system, to date, has not been feasible.9 Thus, the 
assessment of the compatibility of national gambling regulations 
with EU law has been left to the CJEU. 
Greater cooperation at the EU level would help Member 
States more effectively achieve the objectives of consumer 
protection and fraud prevention in regulation of online 
gambling. Until EU-wide regulation becomes a feasible political 
option, if it ever does, this Note argues that the CJEU should 
undertake a specific and stringent judicial review in examining 
                                                                                                             
6. See Hartley, supra note 2, at 47 (listing the number of judicial bodies that 
compose the Court of Justice of the European Union: the Court of Justice, the General 
Court, and the specialized courts); see also ARNULL supra note 2, at 5 (describing the 
establishment of the CJEU in 1951 in the Treaty establishing the European Coal and 
Steel Community and noting that under Article 31 the CJEU must ensure “that in the 
interpretation and application of this Treaty, and of rules laid down for the 
implementation thereof, the law is observed”). 
7. See TFEU, supra note 2, art. 61 (ex art. 54 TEC), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 77 
(allowing restrictions provided they do not discriminate on the basis of nationality); see 
also id. art. 52 (ex art. 46 TEC), at 90 (allowing restrictions on the basis of public policy, 
public security, and public health). 
8. See, e.g., Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise v. Gerhart Schindler and Jörg 
Schindler (“Schindler”), Case C-275/92, [1994] E.C.R. I-1078, ¶ 45 (holding that the 
UK legislation is “an obstacle to the freedom to provide services”). 
9. See CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: 
THE FOUR FREEDOMS 390 (2013) (recognizing regulation in the gambling sector to be a 
“sensitive socio-cultural issue” where Member States are granted a wide margin of 
discretion); see also supra notes 61–73 and accompanying text (regarding the difficulties 
in implementing legislation in the gambling market sector); Alain-Laurent Verbeke, 
Gambling Regulation in Europe: Moving Beyond Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, in IN THE SHADOW 
OF LUXEMBOURG 258 (Alan Littler et al. eds., 2011) (concluding that political sensitivity 
“obviously is the reason” why gambling regulation has not been implemented at the 
EU-level). 
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the compatibility of national regulations of online gambling 
with the Treaty of Lisbon. By thoroughly examining each 
national legislature’s objectives and the discriminatory effects of 
the restrictions they adopt, the CJEU can help ensure that 
national restrictions on the gambling sector systematically 
pursue legitimate national policy objectives which are consistent 
with the objectives of the European Union. 
In Part I, this Note briefly summarizes the state of the 
European gambling market in the context of the Internal 
Market, the lack of EU-wide regulation, and the messy 
compatibility law the CJEU has been left to create on its own. 
Then, in Part II, this Note compares the two conflicting 
frameworks the CJEU has developed over the past two decades 
for analyzing the compatibility of a Member State’s territory-
based and online gambling regulation with the fundamental 
freedoms of the Treaty of Lisbon. In Part III, this Note argues 
that the CJEU should return to the more stringent compatibility 
analysis laid down in two of its leading precedents, Criminal 
proceedings against Piergiorgio Gambelli and Placanica and Others, 
because this more demanding analysis of consistency and 
proportionality in gambling regulation strikes an appropriate 
balance between the ideals of the Treaty of Lisbon and the 
interests of national sovereignty.10 
I. THE EUROPEAN GAMBLING SECTOR AND THE INTERNAL 
MARKET 
Part I provides the background for exploring current 
gambling regulation in the European Union and the conflicts 
the European Union faces. First, Part I.A briefly outlines the 
gambling market in the European Union today. Second, Part I.B 
discusses the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Treaties of 
the European Union and identifies the social policy objectives 
that justify national restrictions on the gambling market. Part I.C 
explains the principle of mutual recognition and how it is 
employed as a gap-filler where there is no EU-wide 
harmonization in an economic sector. Part I.D outlines 
                                                                                                             
10. See Criminal Proceedings against Piergiorgio Gambelli (Gambelli), Case C-
243/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-13031; see also Placanica and Others (Placanica), Joined Cases 
338, 359 & 360/04, [2007] E.C.R. I-1891. 
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measures the EU legislative institutions have taken and goals 
they have set relating to online gambling regulation. Finally, 
Part I.E discusses the preliminary rulings laid down by the CJEU 
analyzing gambling regulation over the past two decades. 
A. The European Gambling Market and National Regulation 
Online gambling, by its nature, is just as accessible across 
national frontiers as within them; this has made it difficult for 
Member States to apply preexisting national territory-based 
gambling regulation to online gambling.11 As the Commission’s 
Green Paper on On-Line Gambling (the “Green Paper”) 
observed, most gambling regulations were devised in the context 
of territory-based gambling regulations and are not effective in 
regulating the Internet.12 The licensed gambling industry in the 
European Union generated an estimated EU€84.9 billion in 
revenues in 2011, and licensed casinos employ an estimated 
55,000 workers.13 With the advent of online gambling sites, such 
                                                                                                             
11. Green Paper, supra note 3, at 3 (concluding that rapid growth of online 
gambling has made it difficult for differing regulatory regimes in Member States to co-
exist). 
12. Green Paper, supra note 3, at 3 (noting that the two regulatory frameworks co-
existed before online gambling because of the limited possibility of providing cross-
border gambling services, and the current “challenges posed by the co-existence of 
differing regulatory models is illustrated by the number of preliminary rulings in this 
area”); see also Anthony Dawes & Kai Struckmann, Rien ne va plus? Mutual Recognition 
and the Free Movement of Services in the Gambling Sector after the Santa Casa Judgment, 35 
EUR. L. REV. 236, 261 (2010) (highlighting a number of preliminary rulings underway 
and the legal uncertainty surrounding online gambling regulation and further 
declaring there are “few fields where the application of the fundamental freedoms is as 
disputed as online gambling”). 
13. See Gambling, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, (Jan. 30, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/gambling/index_en.htm (estimating the overall gambling market 
produces revenues of approximately EU€84.9 billion in 2011 and grows at three 
percent per year); see also Revenues and Employees 2012, EUR. CASINO ASSOC., (2012), 
http://www.europeancasinoassociation.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Facts_and_figures
/Europe_ECA_revenues_2012_final_public_data.pdf (estimating the total number of 
European licensed casino employees in 2012 to be 55,916—this figure excludes other 
sectors of gambling and unlicensed operations). In a study commissioned by the 
European Commission, the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law found that the EU 
gambling market generated Gross Gaming Revenues (“GGR”), which represents gross 
winnings after payment of prizes, of approximately EU€51.5 billion in 2003. This is 
roughly equivalent to the US gaming industry’s generated GGR of EU€60.7 billion 
(approximately US$72.8 billion) in 2003. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, STUDY OF GAMBLING 
SERVICES IN THE INTERNAL MARKET OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 1102 (June 14, 2006); see 
also Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional and 
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as Bwin, Stanleybet, and Happybet, the online gambling industry 
is the most rapidly growing segment of the market, with a 
growth rate of almost fifteen percent annually and projected 
annual revenues to be EU€13 billion in 2015.14 
Online gambling presents new and serious social risks. An 
estimated 6.8 million European gamblers enjoy games of chance 
without leaving their homes, and online financial transactions 
can easily be carried out electronically.15 Online, the player is 
isolated and anonymous; it is difficult for operators to verify the 
gambler’s identity, and minors can circumvent prohibitive 
procedures.16 An unscrupulous operator can open up a website 
and shut it down within minutes of defrauding consumers.17 
                                                                                                             
Bwin International Ltd. v. Departamento de Jogos da Santa Casa da Misericórdia de 
Lisboa (Santa Casa), Case C-42/07, [2009] E.C.R. I-7633, ¶ 27 (stating that the gaming 
industry is considerable, generates a large income, and provides a substantial number 
of jobs). In a later study in 2008, the EU gambling market was estimated to generate 
GGR in excess of EU€75.9 billion that year. See Green Paper, supra note 3, at 8. 
14. See Gambling, supra note 13 (considering online gambling to be the fastest 
growing sector at about 15% per year with revenues expected around EU€13 billion in 
2015); see also Green Paper, supra note 3, at 13 (defining “online gaming” as provision 
via the internet of sports betting services, casino games, media games, gambling 
services operated by and for the benefit of recognized charities and non-profit 
organizations, spread betting, promotional games, and lottery services). 
15. See Gambling, supra note 13 (estimating 6.8 million consumers participate in 
the online gambling market); see also Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Santa Casa, 
[2009] E.C.R. I-7633, ¶ 43 (concluding that gambling via the Internet is becoming 
increasingly available to more consumers, progressively easier to use each year, and that 
financial transactions can easily be carried out through electronic means); SALLY 
GAINSBURY, INTERNET GAMBLING: CURRENT RESEARCH FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 3–4 
(2012) (highlighting that fast and cheap broadband access provides easier, 24/7 access 
from any location to a variety of online gambling activities). 
16. See Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Santa Casa, [2009] E.C.R. I-7633, ¶ 270 
(emphasizing that “Internet relationships are anonymous” and security measures can 
be easily circumvented online); see also Gainsbury supra note 15, at 4 (distinguishing the 
continuous and solitary quality of online gambling from traditional gambling). 
17. The United States recently argued to the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) 
that online gaming facilitates money laundering. Appellate Body Report—United 
States—Measures Affecting the Cross-border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 
WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005). In view of the risks that online gambling poses to the 
consumer and the public order, the Appellate Body of the WTO found that regulations 
imposed by the United States on online gaming “were necessary for the protection of 
public morality and the maintenance of public order.” Opinion of Advocate General 
Bot, Santa Casa, [2009] E.C.R. I-7633, ¶ 274, n.113 (quoting A.B. Report—United States—
Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 327, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005)); see also 
Gainsbury, supra note 15, at 77–78 (discussing examples of gambling sites defrauding 
consumers, such as Absolute Poker and Ultimate Bet employees that bilked consumers 
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Online gambling presents heightened risks of addiction with 
twenty-four hour access to a multitude of games and lines of 
credit at the touch of a button.18 The casino never closes on your 
laptop.  
On the one hand, online gambling creates high risks to 
consumers and society at large; on the other hand, Member 
States often obtain a significant source of revenue from taxes on 
gambling activity.19 Gambling addiction can lead to debt and 
despair, which in one instance induced an Italian policeman to 
kidnap his neighbor’s son for ransom and, in another, led a 
young man to self-immolate. 20  Moreover, organized crime 
groups use legal gambling operations to launder billions of 
euros with little chance of detection.21 The European Union, to 
date, has not taken significant steps to regulate online gambling 
at the EU level due to these politically sensitive social risks 
associated with the activity and the revenue opportunities for 
Member States.22 
                                                                                                             
out of over US$23 million through accessing private accounts and citing identity theft, 
bankruptcy, and scam emails as potential risks associated with online gambling). 
18. See, e.g., François Trucy, The Role of Crime and Addiction in the Gambling Policy of 
France, in CRIME, ADDICTION AND THE REGULATION OF GAMBLING, supra note 2, at 139  
(commenting that the French system of regulation is ill-equipped to face new issues 
posed by online gambling and recognizing the gravity of gambling addiction); see also 
SÉNAT, LA LUTTE CONTRE LA DÉPENDENCE AUX JEUX (Sept. 2007), http://www.senat.fr/
lc/lc175/lc175_mono.html#toc0 (surveying legal measures Germany, Belgium, 
Denmark, Great Britain, Italy, and the Netherlands have taken to fight gambling 
addiction); GAINSBURY, supra note 15, at 3 (reporting that there are an estimated 199 
payment methods available for online gambling, which make payment or withdrawal of 
money through multiple channels or through channels that circumvent regulation 
possible). 
19. See CRIME, ADDICTION AND THE REGULATION OF GAMBLING, supra note 2, at 1 
(acknowledging gambling is regulated in order to both channel the activity and to 
direct profits towards the general interest); see also Caroline Jawad & Stephen Griffiths, 
Preventing Problem Gambling on the Internet Through the Use of Social Responsibility 
Mechanisms, in CRIME, ADDICTION AND THE REGULATION OF GAMBLING, supra note 2, at 
204 (stating that policy makers must balance potential material benefits of gambling 
with the need to curb the activity). 
20. See Tom Kingston, State and Mafia Take Their Cut As Italians Develop Gambling 
Habit, GUARDIAN, Feb. 29, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/feb/29/
state-mafia-italy-gambling (recounting how a policeman kidnapped his neighbor’s son 
for EU€85,000 because he had “lost everything at video poker” and the story of how a 
young Italian man self-immolated due to gambling debt). 
21. See Scherer, supra note 5 (claiming that the mafia clans in Italy are the biggest 
winners in gambling because they use the legal operations to launder billions of euros). 
22. See BARNARD, supra note 9, at 390 (finding gambling regulation to be a 
“sensitive socio-cultural issue” where Member States are granted a significant amount 
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The European Union has enacted rules regulating 
electronic commerce, but these do not fully apply to online 
gambling, and Member States retain the principal regulatory 
role in this sector.23 The lack of a coherent EU-wide policy on 
online gambling and the lack of enforcement of the variety of 
existing national rules across the Member States have created 
legal uncertainty that operators exploit.24 Out of 14,823 active 
Internet gambling sites operating in the European Union in 
2006, the Green Paper indicated that more than eighty-five 
percent of such sites operated without a license in an undefined 
or illegal market.25 Moreover, the problems Member States have 
faced in enforcing regulation in the online gambling sector are 
readily apparent in the unusually large number of preliminary 
rulings the CJEU has been asked to make in this area.26 
                                                                                                             
of discretion); see also GAINSBURY, supra note 15, at 50–52 (citing one of the biggest 
challenges in Europe to be heterogeneous regulation in each Member State, and that 
this inconsistency causes problems for regulators, operators, and consumers alike). 
Gambling services are neither regulated by any sector-specific regulation at the EU 
level, nor included in the Services Directive (2006/123/EC) or the E-commerce 
Directive (2000/31/EC). They are, however, subject to the Audiovisual Media Services 
Directive (2010 O.J. L 95/1), the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (2005 O.J. L 
149/22), the Distance Selling Directive (1997 O.J. L 144/p. 19), the Anti-Money 
Laundering Directive (2005 O.J. L 309/15), the Data Protection Directive (1995 O.J. L 
281/31), the Directive on privacy and electronic communication (2002 O.J. L 201/37), 
and the Directive on the common system of value added tax (2006 O.J. L 347/1). 
Green Paper, supra note 3, at 7, 12 (clarifying that gambling services are not regulated 
at the EU level and are specifically excluded from certain legislation like the E-
commerce Directive and then listing legislation gambling is subject to). 
23. See infra notes 63–73 and accompanying text (discussing regulations governing 
electronic commerce in the European Union and the Member States’ role in 
regulating online gambling). 
24. See Dawes & Struckmann, supra note 12, at 261 (“In these evolving legal 
circumstances, economic operators and their consumers (as well as regulators 
themselves) face considerable legal uncertainty . . . .”); see also GAINSBURY, supra note 
15, at 4 (observing that the regulatory position of online gambling is not clear, which 
creates legal uncertainty for consumers and operators alike). 
25. Green Paper, supra note 3, at 3 (“[O]ut of 14,823 active gambling sites in 
Europe more than 85% operated without any licence.” (citing Laboratoire d’Expertise 
Securite Informatique, Cyber-Criminality in Online Gambling: White Paper by CERT-
LEXSI, July 2006, available at http://www.lexsi.com/telecharger/gambling_cybercrime
_2006.pdf)). 
26. See STUDY OF GAMBLING SERVICES IN THE INTERNAL MARKET OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION, supra note 13, at 4-964 (cataloging 587 cases brought before national Courts, 
mostly in Germany, regarding restrictions on cross-border gambling services as of the 
year 2006). 
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B. The Gambling Regulation Exception to the Fundamental Freedoms 
of the European Union 
Currently, as noted above, the European Parliament and 
the Council have not adopted any measures directed at 
governing online gambling, and there is no EU-wide 
harmonization in the gambling sector. The Member States have, 
over the centuries, developed their own schemes of gambling 
regulations that reflect wide variations both in application and 
social objectives.27 Broadly, two major systems have developed 
across the European Union to regulate gaming. A number of 
states have employed a state monopoly or partial monopoly on 
gambling with success, while others have adopted a licensing 
system often coupled with a quota limit on the number of 
licenses the Member State will grant.28 Both systems, however, 
have been found to restrict the freedom of services.29  The 
European Union, the CJEU, and the Member States have faced 
major challenges in making these disparate regulations 
compatible with the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the 
Treaty of Lisbon.30 
                                                                                                             
27. See CRIME, ADDICTION AND THE REGULATION OF GAMBLING, supra note 2, at 1 
(explaining that governments have regulated gambling for centuries); see also Green 
Paper, supra note 3, at 3 (outlining differing regulatory models applied in Member 
States); STUDY OF GAMBLING SERVICES IN THE INTERNAL MARKET OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION, supra note 14, at xiv–xvi (finding that, generally, if a Member State regulates 
gambling, it either applies a controlled monopoly scheme with the gaming operator 
being owned or controlled by the Member State or a strictly regulated licensing 
system). 
28 . See, e.g., Ladbrokes Betting & Gaming Ltd. v. Stichting de Nationale 
Sporttolisator (Ladbrokes), Case C-258/08, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. 40, ¶ 16 (discussing the 
grant of exclusive monopoly rights to an operator); Massimiliano Placanica, Christian 
Palazzese, Angelo Sorrichio (Placanica), Joined Cases C-338/04, C-359/04, and C-
360/04, [2007] E.C.R. I-1891, ¶¶ 3–10 (outlining the licensing scheme employed in 
Italy whereby the government grants a limited number of licenses to operators). 
29. See, e.g., Gambelli, [2003] E.C.R. I-13031, ¶ 106 (finding the licensing system in 
Italy to be an obstacle to the free provision of services); Liga Portuguesa de Futebol 
Profissional and Bwin International Ltd. v. Departamento de Jogos da Santa Casa da 
Misericórdia de Lisboa (Santa Casa), Case C-42/07, [2009] E.C.R. I-7633, ¶¶ 52–54 
(concluding that the Portuguese public monopoly system is a restriction on the 
freedom to provide services). 
30. See Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi, Carmen Media Group Ltd. v. 
Land Schleswig-Holstein, Innenminister des Landes Schleswig-Holstein, March 3, 2010, 
¶ 1 (asserting that the CJEU’s major challenge in a non-harmonized sector like 
gambling regulation is to “find common ground allowing the observance of the 
freedoms enshrined in the Treaty”). 
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At their core, the Articles that create the Internal Market 
are intended to open up markets in order to increase 
competition and progress, which benefits customers and the 
economy as a whole.31 Free trade allows for specialization and 
greater competition, which, through economies of scale, ideally 
lead to greater productivity.32 Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon 
is designed to prevent national markets from becoming 
“fiefdoms of the providers established there.”33 Markets must be 
kept open for the benefit of all and cannot be allowed to 
“crystallise” or calcify. 34  By preventing this calcification, 
increased trade and mutual dependency promote peace in 
Europe.35 
The CJEU has issued a number of preliminary rulings on 
the compatibility of Member States’ restrictions on gambling 
with the Treaty of Lisbon.36 In many of these rulings, the CJEU 
                                                                                                             
31. See TFEU, supra note 2, art. 26 (ex art. 14 TEC), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 59 
(defining the internal market as comprising “an area without internal frontiers in 
which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in 
accordance with the provisions of the Treaties”); see also ALAN DASHWOOD ET AL, 
WYATT AND DASHWOOD’S EUROPEAN UNION LAW 391 (6th ed. 2011) (“One of the main 
aims of the European integration project is that of market integration.”); Stefan 
Enchelmaier, Always At Your Service (Within Limits): The ECJ’s Case Law on Article 56 
TFEU (2006–11), 36 EUR. L. REV. 615, 639 (2012) (“Above all . . . Member States must 
not discriminate against goods or services from other Member States.”). 
32. BARNARD, supra note 9, at 3–4 (arguing that free trade leads to specialization 
and comparative advantage, this then allows for economies of scale and maximum 
productivity for all (citing ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776))). 
33. Enchelmaier, supra note 31, at 639 (welcoming the CJEU’s rejection of 
Member States’ economic protectionism because “national markets are not the 
fiefdoms of the providers established there”). 
34. Id. at 618 (citing language from Commission v. United Kingdom (beer and wine), 
Case C-170/78, [1983] E.C.R. I-2265, on the prohibition of protectionist taxation 
forbidden by TFEU art. 110 (ex art. 90 EC/95 EEC)). 
35. BARNARD, supra note 9, at 6, 28 (“The driving force behind the European 
Union is, and has always been, the consolidation of a post-war system of inter-state 
cooperation and integration that would make pan-European armed conflict 
inconceivable” and further arguing that increasing prosperity in two interdependent 
trading countries and trade also facilitate peace because “countries trading peacefully 
are less likely to go to war”). 
36. See TFEU, supra note 2, art. 267 (ex art. 234 TEC), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 164 
(granting the CJEU the power to issue preliminary rulings regarding the interpretation 
of the Treaties and the validity of EU acts in reply to questions raised by national courts 
or tribunals); see also The Proceedings of the Court of Justice and Court of First Instance of the 
European Communities, No. 15/95, ¶ 11 (May 22–26, 1995) (stating that the preliminary 
ruling system is the “veritable cornerstone of the . . . internal market, since it . . . 
ensur[es] that the law established by the Treaties retain its Community character with a 
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has found restrictions on the free market to be justified in light 
of certain policy objectives beyond the Treaty-based 
exceptions.37 Attempts to regulate online gambling potentially 
restrict two crucial fundamental freedoms: the freedom of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services. 38  The 
fundamental freedoms provide equal rights of access to the 
market to all, but they do not preclude appropriate regulation 
of the gambling market within each Member States’ borders.39 
The Treaty allows regulation that discriminates on the basis of 
nationality when it is tailored to achieve a “public policy, public 
security or public health” objective.40 
Furthermore, the CJEU has created exceptions to the 
freedoms in the name of overriding public interest, which 
national legislatures often cite in justifying gambling 
                                                                                                             
view to guaranteeing that the law has the same effect in all circumstances in all the 
Member States of the European Union”); ARNULL, supra note 2, at 97 (“It is hard to 
exaggerate the importance of the preliminary rulings procedure.”). The rulings are 
interlocutory and the referring national court is bound by the CJEU’s judgment. See id. 
at 95 (“The ruling given by the Court is an interlocutory one: it constitutes a step in the 
proceedings before the national court which, although bound by it, must proceed to 
apply it to the facts of the case. It is in this sense that the ruling of the Court of Justice is 
preliminary.”); see also DASHWOOD, supra note 31, at 228 (stating that the referring 
court must give full effect to the CJEU’s ruling even if it conflicts with provisions of 
national law). 
37. See TFEU, supra note 2, art. 52 (ex art. 46 TEC), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 69 
(allowing regulation that may restrict the freedom of establishment or free provision of 
services “on grounds of public policy, public security or public health”); see also 
BARNARD, supra note 9, at 497 (stating that the public interest requirements 
supplement the express derogations of article 52). 
38. TFEU, supra note 2, arts. 18, 49, 56 (ex arts. 12, 43, 49 TEC), 2012 O.J. C 326, 
at 56, 67, 70 (prohibiting restrictions on the freedom of primary and secondary 
establishment, prohibiting restrictions on the freedom to provide services, and 
enshrining the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality further); 
DASHWOOD, supra note 31, at 31 (observing that the principle of non-discrimination on 
the basis of nationality has played a central role in the development of EU law in many 
fields beyond services). 
39. Enchelmaier, supra note 31, at 639–40 (asserting that the Internal Market 
means equal rights of access for all but allows the possibility of regulation by each 
Member State). 
40. See TFEU, supra note 3, art. 52 (ex art. 46 TEC), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 69; see also 
BARNARD, supra note 9, at 17 (declaring the principle of non-discrimination to be the 
cornerstone of the four freedoms); see also Jochen Meulman & Henri de Waele, A 
Retreat from Säger? Servicing or Fine-Tuning the Application of Article 49, 33 LEGAL ISSUES 
ECON. INTEGRATION 207, 210 (2006) (outlining the theoretical underpinnings of the 
free provision of services and concluding that striving for non-discrimination and 
market access will better help to integrate national markets). 
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regulations. In the 1974 leading precedent, J.H.M. van 
Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de 
Metaalnijverheid, the CJEU held that Member States could 
restrict and regulate cross-border services to protect the 
“general good” or public interest.41 Van Binsbergen determined 
that certain overriding policy objectives, like maintaining 
standards of conduct in the legal profession, could justify a 
restriction on provision of services. Later rulings have reaffirmed 
this holding and given the compatibility analysis more teeth in 
protecting market access.42 Thus, overriding policy objectives 
may justify a gambling regulation if grounded in moral, 
religious, or cultural factors, or if the legislature shows that 
gambling has harmful consequences.43 
The two major types of policy justifications that the CJEU 
has found sufficient to allow restriction in the gambling sector 
are consumer protection and crime prevention.44 The CJEU, 
                                                                                                             
41 . J.H.M. van Binsbergen v. Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de 
Metaalnijverheid (Van Binsbergen), Case C-33/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1299, ¶ 12 (“[S]pecific 
requirements imposed on the person providing the service cannot be considered 
incompatible with the Treaty where they have as their purpose the application of 
profession rules justified by the general good . . . .”); see also Stichting Collectieve 
Antennevoorziening Gouda v. Commissariaat voor de Media (Gouda), Case 2-88/89, 
[1991] E.C.R. I-4007, ¶ 10 (“Article [56 TFEU] entails, in the first place, the abolition 
of any discrimination against a person providing services on the grounds of his 
nationality or the fact that he is established in a Member State other than the one in 
which the service is provided.”). In Van Binsbergen, a Dutch national who lived in 
Belgium challenged a rule that required lawyers to be established in the Netherlands 
before they could represent a client in Dutch courts. Van Binsbergen, [1974] E.C.R. 
1299, at 1301–02. 
42. See Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano 
(Gebhard), Case C-55/94, [1995] E.C.R. I-4165, ¶ 37 (“[N]ational measures liable to 
hinder or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the 
Treaty must fulfill four conditions: they must be applied in a non-discriminatory 
manner; they must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest; they 
must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and 
they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.”); see also BARNARD, 
supra note 9, at 19 (arguing that the CJEU since Gebhard favors the market access 
approach, which finds unlawful Member State regulation that prevents or hinders 
access to the market, regardless of whether the regulation discriminates on the basis of 
nationality). 
43. Gambelli, [2003] E.C.R. I-13031, ¶ 63 (finding that moral, religious, and 
cultural factors can justify granting a margin of discretion to national authorities in 
regulation of gambling activities and determining “what consumer protection and the 
preservation of public order require”). 
44. See Dawes & Struckmann, supra note 12, at 239 (dividing the acceptable policy 
justifications into two main categories: “social” objectives such as consumer protection 
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however, is seen by some scholars to give greater deference to 
the national legislatures when they are regulating against 
crime.45 Social objectives are increasingly used to justify national 
gambling regulations, but the CJEU has consistently rejected 
Member State objectives of economic protectionism, the 
stabilization of tax revenue, and administrative convenience.46 
Moreover, the CJEU insists in its rulings on the consistency 
and proportionality of the means to the targeted policy 
objectives. Indeed, the CJEU stated in Gambelli that where a 
Member State pursues a policy of expanding gambling 
operations and aggressively advertising for its own state-run 
gambling enterprise, the policy and advertisements could be 
found inconsistent with the legislative objective of protecting 
                                                                                                             
and crime reduction objectives). But see Verbeke, supra note 9, at 257 (questioning why 
consumer protection against addiction is regulated at the national level—“[a]re the 
risks for a Belgian player so different form those for someone in Germany, France, or 
Greece?”). 
45. See Dawes & Struckmann, supra note 12, at 240, 244 (stating that there is little 
evidence given of fraud online or studies produced on this issue, and that the CJEU has 
granted too much deference and discretion to the national legislatures here, and also 
arguing that the CJEU has adopted a more stringent approach in relation to social 
objectives in contrast to objectives aimed at reducing criminal activity); Verbeke, supra 
note 9, at 258 (declaring that “criminality is an international business” and arguing 
that it should be attacked at the EU-level). But see Joined Opinion of Advocate General 
Bot for Sporting Exchange Ltd. (t/a Betfair) v. Minister van Justitie and Ladbrokes Ltd. 
v. Stichting de Nationale Sporttolisator, ¶ 92 (“I do not think that the defence of the 
fundamental freedoms of movement justifies expecting the Member States to wait until 
actual networks of clandestine gaming develop . . . . A Member State has the right to 
invoke the risk of fraud associated with gaming as the basis for legislation restricting 
that activity, without being required to show that fraud is actually being committed in 
its territory.”); Dawes & Struckmann, supra note 12, at 240 (“A national measure aimed 
at reducing criminal activity relating to gambling may therefore be necessary and 
proportionate, even where its net result is to incite and encourage consumers to 
participate in games of chance.”). 
46. See Enchelmaier, supra note 31, at 639 (discussing examples of the CJEU 
rejecting these types of objectives in the gambling regulation case law: The Italian 
government’s proposed economic protectionism objective in limiting horse-race 
betting failed in Commission v. Italy and the French government’s pursuit of stable tax 
revenue used to invest in rural projects failed to justify regulations in Zeturf); see also 
Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Placanica, ¶ 108 (stating that the CJEU 
has rejected the diminution or tax revenue or loss of financing as an overriding policy 
justification in past judgments such as Gambelli); Zeturf Ltd. v. Premier Ministre 
(Zeturf), Case C-212/08, [2011] 3 C.M.L.R. 30, ¶ 48 (“[A]dministrative inconvenience 
does not constitute a ground that can justify a restriction on a fundamental freedom 
guaranteed by [EU] law.”). 
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consumers from the vice of gambling.47 In order to control and 
prevent fraud in gambling activities, however, the Member State 
needs its regulated gambling system to be the preferred system 
for prospective gamblers; this requires advertising, a range of 
games of chance, and top-of-the-line facilities.48 As the CJEU 
pointed out in Gambelli, however, the goal of consumer 
protection is ultimately undermined by the marketing and 
expansion of state-owned or controlled gambling systems that 
induces consumers to use the gambling product.49 Consumers 
are not protected against the risks of gambling where the 
Member State is hypocritically encouraging the consumers to 
gamble. 
C. Lack of Harmonization and the Principle of Mutual Recognition of 
Regulation 
There is currently no harmonization in the field of 
gambling regulation though the EU legislature has the power to 
adopt directives to harmonize differing rules in each Member 
State into one uniform EU-wide rule that advances the internal 
                                                                                                             
47 . See Gambelli, [2003] E.C.R. I-13031, ¶¶ 68–69 (stating that the Italian 
authorities were pursuing an expansionist policy in gambling and could not justify such 
legislation in the name of consumer protection and reducing gambling opportunities 
in Italy); see also Opinion of Advocate General Alber, Gambelli, [2003] E.C.R. I-13031, ¶ 127 
(declaring “it is clear from the submissions of the Member States that what they fear 
most is the economic consequences of changes within the gambling sector. Little 
reference is made in this context to any dangerous effects that gambling might have on 
gamblers and their social environment. Consequently, such fears likewise cannot be 
regarded as an interest in the protection of consumers that would constitute an 
overriding reason in the general interest.”). But see Ladbrokes, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. 40, ¶ 
38 (holding that it is for the national court “to determine whether unlawful gaming 
activities constitute a problem which might be solved by the expansion of authorised 
and regulated activities, and whether that expansion is on such a scale as to make it 
impossible to reconcile with the objective of curbing such addiction”). 
48. See Ladbrokes, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. 40, ¶ 25 (concluding that in order to channel 
gambling activity, Member States need to be a “reliable” and “attractive” alternative to 
clandestine gambling operations); see also infra notes 165–73 and accompanying text 
(summarizing the CJEU’s opinion in Ladbrokes and Betfair). 
49. See Opinion of Advocate General Alber, Gambelli, [2003] E.C.R. I-13031, ¶¶ 121, 
127–29 (observing that the Italian authorities pursue “aggressive” advertising 
“intended to instill and foster a desire to gamble” and it is clear that Italy most fears a 
loss of revenue, and that these economic objectives cannot justify a restriction on the 
free provision of services). 
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market.50 Harmonization of disparate Member State regulations 
can vary in degree; a common form called minimum 
harmonization sets the floor for national regulation, while 
comprehensive harmonization leaves little room for national 
differences.51 Since the landmark judgment of Rewe-Zentral AG v. 
Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (“Cassis de Dijon”), the 
Commission and the CJEU have applied the principle of mutual 
recognition in the free movement of goods as a gap-filler in the 
absence of harmonization.52  
Mutual recognition is considered to be a “corner stone” of 
the Internal Market because it enables products to move freely 
despite differing national regulations. 53  When applied in a 
market sector, mutual recognition provides that goods in 
conformity with one Member State’s regulations are also in 
conformity with another Member State’s regulations, despite 
discrepancies, and, thus, creates a presumption in favor of 
                                                                                                             
50 . See BARNARD, supra note 9, at 656 (summarizing harmonization as the 
replacing of many divergent Member State regulations in a specific field with a single 
EU-wide regulation). 
51. Id. at 662 (establishing that minimum harmonization sets standards for the 
Member States, but the Member States are still free to legislate further, an especially 
attractive option in areas of regulation that implicate social and moral policy). States 
are free to experiment above the minimum standard, but they usually have to inform 
the Commission about the acts they have implemented. This creates a useful database 
for the Commission about successful policy initiatives that can then be implemented 
EU-wide. Id. at 662, 665–66. One example of success in using the Member States as 
policy labs is in the environmental field: Austria, Finland, and Sweden successfully 
applied stricter environmental standards than required by the directive, which led to 
the adoption of higher EU-wide standards in a number of areas. Id. at 666 n. 258 
(discussing COM (98) 745). 
52. Cassis de Dijon, Case 120/78, [1979] E.C.R. 649 (decided on free movement of 
goods grounds). This case involved the banning of importation into Germany of fruit 
liqueurs due to insufficient alcohol content. The CJEU found that absent 
harmonization, there is no reason why lawfully produced and marketed goods cannot 
be sold in another Member State. Id. ¶ 13. Shortly after this ruling, the Commission 
issued an interpretative communication, which recognizes the principle of equivalence 
or mutual recognition. BARNARD, supra note 9, at 95; see European Commission, 
Communication from the Commission Regarding the Cassis de Dijon Judgment, 1980 
OJ C256/2. In 2007, the Commission revitalized this principle of mutual recognition 
through regulation. European Commission, Package on the Internal Market for Goods, 
COM (2007) 35. 
53. See Commission, Communication on Internal Market Strategy, Priorities 2003–
2006, COM (2003) 238 final, at 7 (May 2003) (basing the presumption that products in 
conformity with the national laws of the Member State allow the product marketed to 
move freely in that Member State on the Cassis judgment, and declaring “[m]utual 
recognition is the corner stone of the Internal Market”). 
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market access.54 The principle of mutual recognition is also 
applied with regard to services and establishment.55 
In 2009 in Liga Portuguesa de Futebol Profissional and Bwin 
International Ltd v. Departamento de Jogos da Santa Casa da 
Misericórdia de Lisboa, the CJEU rejected the application of 
mutual recognition in the gambling sector.56 The CJEU followed 
the Opinion of AG Yves Bot who found that encouraging 
competition in gambling is not “a source of progress and 
development” in the same way as, for example, the freedom of 
movement of patients within the European Union increased the 
rang of medical treatment available.57 AGs Dámaso Ruiz-Jarabo 
Colomer and Siegbert Alber, however, argue that mutual 
                                                                                                             
54. See BARNARD, supra note 9, at 95 (explaining that goods produced in one 
Member State would have market access in all other Member States and citing the 
Commission’s response to Cassis); see also Commission, Communication from the 
Commission regarding the Cassis de Dijon judgment, 1980 O.J. C 256/2 (recognizing 
the Cassis decision and the application of the principle of mutual recognition; Opinion 
of Advocate General Mengozzi, Carmen Media, [2010] E.C.R. I-8149, ¶ 33 (categorizing 
mutual recognition as a tool aimed at guaranteeing market access across the European 
Union even in sectors with significant discrepancies in regulation, and stressing the 
importance of balance so that the Member State where the service is provided is not 
duplicating controls of the provider Member State). 
55. See Dawes & Struckmann, supra note 12, at 259 (“The concept of mutual 
recognition was developed by the [CJEU] as a way to facilitate market access for goods 
. . . [and] was later extended by the Court to other freedoms so as to ensure the 
achievement of the objectives of the common market in the absence of harmonization 
. . . .” (citing Säger v. Dennemeyer & Co. Ltd., Case C-76/90 [1991] E.C.R. I-4221)). 
56. See Santa Casa, [2009] E.C.R. I-7633, ¶ 69 (holding that a Member State is 
entitled to regard regulations in other Member States as insufficient assurance that 
national consumers will be protected against crime and the other risks of gambling); see 
also Dickinger & Ömer, Case C-347/09, [2011] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 96 (delivered Sept. 15, 
2011) (not yet reported) (re-establishing that there is no duty of mutual recognition in 
this field); Georgios Anagnostaras, Les Jeux Sont Faits? Mutual Recognition and the 
Specificities of Online Gambling, 37 EUR. L. REV. 191, 192 (2012) (stating that gambling 
“escapes completely the application of the mutual recognition principle.”). 
57. Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Santa Casa, [2009] E.C.R. I-7633, ¶¶ 245–
47 (failing to see how increasing competition in the gambling market would lead to 
progress and development of the EU community and finding comparison between 
increased competition in gambling inapposite to increased competition in medical 
treatment); see Joined Opinion Advocate General Bot, Ladbrokes and Betfair, [2010] 3 
C.M.L.R. 40, ¶¶ 15, 119–24 (concluding that the principle of mutual recognition 
should not apply to the gambling market and that a Member State is entitled to find 
another State’s gambling regulations insufficient protection against fraud and crime). 
But see Dawes & Struckmann, supra note 12, at 252 (arguing that this “gives the 
Member States carte blanche to impose unjustified restrictions on the provision of online 
gambling services by all EU-licences online gambling operators, regardless of the 
integrity of such operators”). 
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recognition should be applied to the gambling sector as it has 
been applied to other politically sensitive areas like criminal 
law.58 As there is such great diversity in national regulation of 
gambling, mutual recognition may be hard for legislators and 
operators to apply because it would be difficult to recognize the 
validity of a public monopoly grant in a licensing system 
Member State or vice versa.59 Some scholars believe this makes 
the case for harmonization more compelling.60 
D. Actions Taken by the European Union Legislature 
The intricate EU “ordinary legislative” process makes 
adopting EU-wide regulation difficult. The “ordinary legislative 
procedure” in the European Union involves multiple steps, 
initiated by the Commission and ending in enactment only if 
                                                                                                             
58. See, e.g., Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Placanica, [2007] 
E.C.R. I-1894, ¶ 130 (concluding that he shares AG Alber’s opinion that if an operator 
from one Member State meets the regulatory requirements applicable in another State, 
that should provide “sufficient guarantee of the integrity of the operator”); see also 
Opinion of Advocate General Alber, Gambelli, [2003] E.C.R. I-13031, ¶ 118 (discussing 
that gambling is regulated in all Member States on largely the same grounds, and 
concluding thus, if an operator is licensed in one Member State, that should be a 
sufficient guarantee of the operator’s integrity.); Anagnostaras, supra note 56, at 194–
95 (arguing that the “it is precisely in the absence of legislative approximation that this 
principle comes into play” and commenting that mutual recognition has been applied 
successfully in criminal law (citing Cassis de Dijon, Case C-120/78, [1979] E.C.R. 649, 
¶ 8; Arblade, Case C-376/96, [1999] E.C.R. I-8453)); Council Framework Decision 
2002/584/JHA. O.J. L190/1 (June 13, 2002) (outlining the EU arrest warrant and 
surrender procedures between Member States); TFEU, supra note 3, art. 67(3) (ex art. 
61 TEC and ex art. 29 TEU), 2008 O.J. C 115/47, at 97 (recognizing the application of 
mutual recognition of judgments in criminal matters). 
59. Enchelmaier, supra note 31, at 624 (discussing the intricacies of applying 
mutual recognition and the fact that the principle mainly rests on an analysis of 
whether the aims of legislation in the Member State where the service is provided are 
being achieved by regulations in place in the Member State where the operator is 
based). 
60. Dimitrios Doukas, In a Bet There Is a Fool and a State Monopoly: Are the Odds 
Stacked Against Cross-Border Gambling?, 36 EUR. L. REV. 242, 263 (2012) (“The 
inadequacy of the Court’s approach and the adverse impact of the divergences in 
national laws on the establishment and functioning of the internal market for gambling 
and associated services make the need for EU harmonization compelling.”); see also 
Dimitrios Doukas & Jack Anderson, Commercial Gambling Without Frontiers: When the ECJ 
Throws, the Dice is Loaded, 27 Y.B. EURO. L. 257 (2008) (describing the piecemeal 
approach to gambling regulation in the current absence of minimum harmonization as 
“ultimately self-defeating”). 
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the European Parliament and Council reach an agreement.61 
This process of joint action on legislation makes regulating 
politically sensitive issues like gambling even more complicated 
and the possibility of EU-wide harmonization seem unlikely at 
this time.62 
Although gambling regulation is somewhat difficult to 
implement due to the complexities of the EU legislative process 
and the policy concerns of Member States, gambling regulation 
has consistently been on the institution’s agenda. The 
Commission first suggested that regulation of gambling should 
be subject to the single market regime in 1991, but did not press 
the issue due to some Member States’ reluctance.63 Although the 
European Parliament and Council adopted the E-commerce 
Directive in 2000, gambling and games of chance were expressly 
excluded from that Directive’s coverage. 64  The issues of 
gambling regulation were highlighted in the Presidency of the 
Council progress reports in both 2008 and 2009, and Parliament 
in 2009 called on Member States to cooperate on solving 
                                                                                                             
61. See DASHWOOD, supra note 31, at 73 (finding this “dual democratic basis is 
best reflected in the Union’s ‘ordinary legislative procedure’—previously known as co-
decision—since it is based on an equal say between the European Parliament and the 
Council”); see also TFEU, supra note 2, art. 294 (ex art. 251 TEC), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 
173–74 (renaming the co-decision process the “ordinary legislative procedure”). The 
Commission has the sole power to initiate a legislative draft. See TEU post-Lisbon, supra 
note 4, art. 17(2), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 25 (“Union legislative acts may only be adopted 
on the basis of a Commission proposal, except where the Treaties provide otherwise.”); 
see also Dashwood, supra note 32, at 72 (stating this rule was developed to ensure 
legislative powers would only be initiated by “the Union institution with a duty to act 
independently and without regard to any specific national interests.”). Then the 
European Parliament and the Council begin the process of co-decision. See Dashwood, 
supra note 32, at 74 Figure 4.1 (displaying a graph of the ordinary legislative 
procedure); see also Hartley, supra note 3, at 37–38 (describing the legislative process 
whereby a Commission proposal is debated and amended by both the European 
Parliament and the Council). 
62. See Rose M. Lastra, Banking Union and Single Market: Conflict or Companionship?, 
36 FORDHAM INT’L. L.J. 1190, 1194–1201 & nn. 7–33 (outlining recent example of the 
complex legislative process in the context of creating a banking union). 
63. See Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, Placanica, [2007] 
E.C.R. I-1894, ¶ 145 (attempting on the Commission’s part to regulate gambling based 
of the results in a study); see also Presidency Conclusions, Edinburgh, Dec. 11–12, 1992, 
DOC/92/8 (Dec. 13, 1992) (deciding on the Council’s part not to harmonize 
gambling regulation). 
64. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, 
in the Internal Market. 
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discrete issues like fraud prevention, age minimums for online 
gambling, and minimum requirements for consumer 
protection.65 
The Commission’s 2011 Green Paper surveyed the current 
policy challenges in regulating online gambling and was 
designed to launch a dialogue about possible solutions to the 
lack of consistency. 66  A year later, the Commission’s 
Communication entitled “Towards a comprehensive European 
framework for online gambling” set out recommendations on 
consumer protection and advertising in gambling. 67  The 
Communication also announced the Commission’s decision to 
re-launch infringement proceedings against nine Member States 
and to investigate legislation in twenty Member States. 68 
Proceedings brought by the Commission against Member States 
for infringements of Treaty or secondary rules are a vital mode 
of enforcing EU law. 69  The Commission soon fulfilled the 
promise of the 2012 Communication and reinvigorated the 
infringement proceedings against noncompliant Member States 
in November 2013. 70  These are the first Commission 
                                                                                                             
65. Progress Report of the French Presidency of the EU, Gambling and Betting: 
Legal Framework and Policies in the Member States of the EU, DOC/16022/08 (Nov. 
27, 2008); see also Progress Report of the Swedish Presidency of the EU, Legal 
Framework for Gambling and Betting in the Member States of the European Union, , 
DOC/16571/09 (Nov. 25, 2009); European Parliament resolution of 10 March 2009 on 
the integrity of online gambling, 2008/2215(INI); Dawes & Struckmann, supra note 12, 
at 254 (summarizing that the Report and Resolution reject complete harmonization of 
online gambling regulation, but both call on Member State cooperation on a number 
of issues). 
66. See Green Paper, supra note 3, at 3 (highlighting that the goal of the Green 
Paper is to launch a public discussion on policy challenges and issues with respect to 
the growth of online gambling in the European Union). 
67. Communication from the Commission, Towards a Comprehensive European 
Framework for Online Gambling, COM (2012) 596 final (Oct. 23, 2012). 
68. See id. (re-launching proceedings against Germany, Greece, the Netherlands, 
Hungary, Greece, Sweden, and Finland). 
69. See TFEU, supra note 2, art. 258 (ex art. 226 TEC), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 160 
(creating the Commission’s power to bring infringement proceedings against 
noncompliant Member States); see also DASHWOOD, supra note 31, at 135 (finding the 
power given to the Commission to enforce and supervise Member State compliance 
with their obligations to the Treaties to be distinguished from other supranational 
orders). 
70. Commission, Commission Requests Member States to Comply with EU law 
when Regulating Gambling Services, IP/13/1101 (2013). 
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infringement proceedings to remove obstacles to free trade in 
gambling regulation since 2008.71 
At the same time the Commission re-launched 
infringement proceedings, the European Parliament adopted a 
resolution on online gambling in September 2013. 72  This 
resolution stressed the unique risks online gambling poses to 
consumer health, and it recommended that uniform, EU-wide 
common online security standards be adopted and 
administrative cooperation be increased. 73  Presumably the 
Council’s silence on the matter of gambling regulation since the 
1992 decision not to harmonize speaks to its reluctance to 
initiate legislation in this area. However, the recent legislative 
discussion surrounding gambling regulation may lead to 
minimum harmonization, or, at the very least, increased 
protection of the internal market through infringement 
proceedings. 
E. Development of a Compatibility Analysis for Gambling Regulations 
by the CJEU 
The CJEU has largely shouldered the burden of reconciling 
the free market principles of EU law and differing national 
gambling regulations. Part I.E.1 summarizes the CJEU’s basic 
compatibility framework applied to disputes regarding gambling 
regulations. Part I.E.2 describes the earliest, highly deferential 
preliminary rulings on gambling regulation starting with 
Schindler in 1994 that preceded the conflicting case-law discussed 
in Part II. Next, Part I.E.3 addresses the three German cases the 
Grand Chamber delivered on September 8, 2010 (the “German 
Triad”), which followed the cases in Part II and reinvigorated 
analysis used in Gambelli. Part I.E.4 considers this continued 
trend of the CJEU adhering closely to the ideals of the 
fundamental freedoms by demanding support for the 
                                                                                                             
71 . See Commission, Commission Acts to Remove Obstacles to Provision of 
Gambling Services in Greece and The Netherlands, IP/08/330 (2013). 
72. European Parliament Resolution on Online Gambling in the Internal Market, 
2012/2322(INI) (Sept. 10, 2013). The Resolution was adopted 572 votes to 79, with 61 
abstentions. Id. 
73. Id.; see also Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection, 
Report on Online Gambling in the Internal Market 2012/2311 (INI) (Ashley Fox, 
Rapporteur). 
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legislature’s policy objectives and employing a searching analysis 
of the proportionality of gambling regulations with these 
objectives. Next, Part I.E.5 explores the potential resurrection of 
mutual recognition in the gambling market in the 2012 HIT and 
HIT Larix judgment. Finally, Part I.E.6 examines two recent 
decisions in which the CJEU implicitly argues for the more 
liberalized licensing systems that are more faithful to the Treaty 
of Lisbon principles. 
1. The Compatibility Framework Applied to Preliminary Rulings 
Regarding Gambling Regulations in the CJEU 
Over the past two decades, the CJEU has consistently found 
national regulations on gambling to be restrictions on the 
fundamental freedoms justified by reasons of overriding public 
interest.74 These restrictions must not discriminate on the basis 
of nationality and must be proportionate.75 The proportionality 
analysis requires that the national regulation be a suitable and 
necessary means to the stated end.76 
                                                                                                             
74. See Santa Casa, [2009] E.C.R. I-7633, ¶ 57 (finding that there are “significant 
moral, religious, and cultural differences between the Member States,” and thus it is in 
within each Member States’ discretion to decide what regulation is needed to protect 
cited interests); see also Sjöberg & Gerdin, Joined Cases 447 & 448/08, [2010] E.C.R. I-
6921, ¶ 37 (observing that in gambling regulation there are significant differences 
between Member States, and allowing that it is up to each State to enact legislation that 
protects different interests); Green Paper, supra note 3, at 11 (citing certain overriding 
interests like consumer protection that have been recognized by the CJEU as 
justifications for restrictions on free provision of services). 
75. See TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 4, art. 5(4), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 18 (“(4) 
Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall not 
exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties”); see also Placanica, 
[2007] E.C.R. I-1891, ¶¶ 48, 58 (holding that restrictive legislation must satisfy the 
proportionality analysis); Sporting Exchange Ltd. (t/a Betfair) v. Minister van Justitie, 
Case C-203/08, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. 41, ¶ 29 (establishing that national courts must 
determine that the regulations are proportionate to the stated objectives). 
76. See Gebhard, [1995] E.C.R. I-4165, ¶ 37 (“[N]ational measures liable to hinder 
or make less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty 
must fulfill four conditions: they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; they 
must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest; they must be 
suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and they must 
not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.”); see also Gambelli, [2003] E.C.R. I-
13031, ¶¶ 64–65 (citing the suitability and necessity language of Gebhard); Lindman, 
[2003] E.C.R. I-13543, ¶ 25 (finding restrictions must be analyzed for proportionality 
and appropriateness under Gebhard). Suitability requires that the means employed 
must be adequate or appropriate to attain the stated ends. See BARNARD, supra note 9, 
at 177 (citing NV United Foods and PVBA Aug. Van den Abeele v. Belgium, Case 
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Where the Member State adopts a system of licensing of 
gambling operators, the CJEU requires transparency and an 
impartial, competitive procedure for granting licenses. 77 
Monopolies and quotas on the number of licensed operators 
can be justified, but they must reflect a “genuine diminution in 
gambling opportunities” and limit gambling in a “consistent 
and systematic manner” across the sector.78 Also, because the 
national legislatures often do not distinguish in their regulations 
among gambling marketing channels, the assessment of 
compatibility carried out by the CJEU does not distinguish 
between online and in situ gambling.79 
The CJEU has, however, recognized that the risks of online 
gambling to consumers are different and potentially greater 
than those posed by land-based gambling due to the constant 
accessibility of Internet and the lack of contact between player 
and operator. 80  Though the CJEU has acknowledged the 
                                                                                                             
132/80, [1981] E.C.R. 995, ¶ 28). When considering necessity, the CJEU balances the 
burden placed on the regulated conduct against the benefits to the stated objective 
pursued by the Member State. See BARNARD, supra note 9, at 177; see also HARTLEY, 
supra note 2, at 123 (arguing that the necessity analysis is in place to safeguard against 
overbroad Union legislation). 
77. See Doukas, supra note 60, at 244 (describing the principles applied to limit 
restrictions on freedoms and the procedure required of licensing schemes); see also 
Placanica, [2007] E.C.R. I-1891, ¶¶ 61–64 (outlining the requirements of licensing 
tender procedures such as impartiality). 
78. Questore di Verona v. Diego Zenatti (“Zenatti”), Case C-67/98, [1999] E.C.R. 
I-07289, ¶¶ 35–36 (finding a limitation on gambling acceptable if it aims at bringing 
about a “genuine diminution in gambling opportunities”); see Gambelli, [2003] E.C.R. I-
13031, ¶¶ 62, 67 (citing the “genuine diminution” language in Zenatti and reiterating 
that restrictions based on overriding policy justifications must limit gambling activity 
“in a consistent and systematic manner”); Placanica, [2007] E.C.R. I-1891, ¶ 53 
(combining the language in Zenatti and Gambelli to hold that restrictions must aim at “a 
genuine diminution of gambling opportunities and [limiting] activities in that sector in 
a consistent and systematic manner”). 
79. Zeturf, [2011] 3 C.M.L.R. 30, ¶ 76 (applying an “overall assessment” instead of 
a distribution-channel-specific assessment); see also Anagnostaras, supra note 56, at 199 
(arguing that Zeturf makes it clear that online gambling is not a separate market but a 
separate distribution channel of the greater gambling market). 
80. See Ladbrokes, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. 40, ¶ 55 (“Online games of chance involve 
different and more substantial risks of fraud against consumers mainly due to lack of 
direct contact.”); see also Santa Casa, [2009] E.C.R. I-7633, ¶ 70 (contending that the 
lack of contact between the operator and consumer involves a “more substantial” risk 
of fraud compared to in situ gambling); Opinion of Advocate General Bot, Santa Casa, 
[2009] E.C.R. I-7633, ¶ 267 (finding the “permanent availability of the opportunity to 
play, the frequency of wins, its enticing or attractive nature, the possibility of staking 
large sums, the availability of credit in order to play, the location of games at places 
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possibly of greater social risks posed by online gambling, it 
applies the same analysis to both online and conventional 
gaming legislation. 
2. The Early Preliminary Rulings on Compatibility 
The basic guiding principles of the compatibility analysis 
were developed in highly deferential judgments relating to 
regulations of territory-based gambling operations, and their 
application to online gambling operations is not always clear. 
This developmental period in the CJEU’s case law in the 1990s 
led to the view that Member States have a large margin of 
discretion in regulating gambling on the basis of overriding 
policy objectives.81 In Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise v. Gerhart 
Schindler and Jörg Schindler, the CJEU accepted the United 
Kingdom’s justifications for the regulation without any analysis 
of the social repercussions of gambling.82 By the end of the 
decade the CJEU began to move towards a stricter analysis with 
the decision in Questore di Verona v. Diego Zenatti.83 There, the 
                                                                                                             
where people can play on an impulse and, finally, the fact that there is no information 
campaign regarding the risks of gaming” to be especially troubling aspects of online 
gaming). 
81. Zenatti, [1999] E.C.R. I-07289, ¶¶ 33–34 (finding gambling regulation to fall 
“within the margin of appreciation” the CJEU grants national authorities); see 
Associaçāo Nacional de Operadores de Máquinas Recreativas (Anomar) and Others v. 
Estado português (Anomar), Case C-6/01, [2003] E.C.R. I-08621, ¶¶ 78, 87 
(recognizing the discretion granted to Member States in relation to gambling 
regulation). Anomar dealt with a challenge to Portuguese monopoly regulations. See id. 
¶¶ 2, 7, 28 (explaining that Portuguese national law grants the right to operate 
gambling facilities solely to the State and the action at hand challenges this regulatory 
framework). Anomar was decided two months prior to Gambelli by the Third Chamber, 
but lacked the more searching analysis employed by the full Court of Justice in 
Gambelli. See id. ¶ 1 (receiving the reference on January 8, 2001 and deciding the case 
on September 11, 2003). But see Gambelli, [2003] E.C.R. I-13031, ¶ 1 (receiving the 
reference on June 22, 2001, and deciding the matter on November 6, 2003). 
82. Schindler, [1994] E.C.R. I-1078, ¶¶ 57–59, 63 (holding crime prevention and 
consumer protection to justify restriction on the freedom to provide services without 
examining justifications further or calling for support on the record); see Doukas & 
Anderson, supra note 60, at 240 (finding that the CJEU in Schindler did not even apply a 
proportionality test). 
83. See Zenatti, [1999] E.C.R. I-07289. But see Julia Hörnle, Online Gambling in the 
European Union: A Tug of War Without a Winner? 10 (Queen Mary Univ. of London, 
School of Law, Legal Stud. Research Paper No 48/2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1593249 (arguing that Zenatti applies the same “soft” proportionality test as 
Läärä and discusses gambling in the same “moral, religious, and cultural” framework as 
Schindler which grants Member States great discretion). 
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CJEU asked the national court to examine the policy objectives 
for a “genuine” desire to reduce gambling, and to ensure that 
the tax revenues were only an “incidental” benefit to reduction 
and channeling of gambling activities.84 These early rulings of 
the CJEU from 1994 and 1999 established that gambling 
regulations restrict the provision of services but were highly 
deferential to the prerogatives of the national legislatures in 
regulating gambling activity.85 This highly deferential treatment 
granted to the Member States far exceeded the scope of the 
exceptions granted by Articles 52 and 61 TFEU to the 
fundamental freedoms and was not true to the goals of the 
internal market. 
The CJEU reasoned in Schindler in 1994 that because of the 
differing moral and cultural perceptions of gambling from 
nation to nation, the restrictions imposed by the United 
Kingdom on gambling activity were justified on social objectives 
grounds.86 Thus, as long as gambling regulations are applied 
evenhandedly, it is within a Member State’s discretion to restrict 
the activity.87  
In 1999, the CJEU in Markku Juhani Läärä, Cotswold 
Microsystems Ltd. and Oy Transatlantic Software Ltd. v. 
Kihlakunnansyyttäjä (Jyväskylä) and Suomen valtio (Finnish State) 
                                                                                                             
84 . See Zenatti, [1999] E.C.R. I-07289, ¶¶ 35–36 (calling for the “genuine 
diminution in gambling opportunities” and the guarantee that financial benefits are 
only “incidental” to the larger policy justifications for restricting gambling within a 
Member State); see also Doukas & Anderson, supra note 60, at 242 (characterizing the 
deference granted to the national court as a “mitigation” of the proportionality test). 
85. See SPORTS BETTING, supra note 2, at 34 (discussing the CJEU’s position in 
Schindler as “erring on the side of national regulations and justifications” for restrictive 
licensing and monopolies); see also Doukas & Anderson, supra note 60, at 242 (assessing 
the preliminary rulings on gambling regulations from Schindler to Zenatti as a 
“disappointment”). 
86. Schindler, [1994] E.C.R. I-1078, ¶¶ 57–59, 63 (finding the prevention of crime 
and protection of consumers to justify restriction on the freedom to provide services). 
In this ruling, the CJEU also confirmed for the first time that gambling is an economic 
activity that falls within the purview of the Treaty. Id. ¶¶ 19, 25, 34 (finding that 
“lotteries constitute an economic activity, within the meaning of the Treaty” and are to 
be regarded as services within the meaning of the Treaty.). This case concerned 
German agents of a lottery advertising and possibly importing tickets into the United 
Kingdom in violation of regulations on gambling. Id. ¶¶ 3–5 (stating that the 
Schindlers sent applications via mail to the United Kingdom from the Netherlands for 
the German lottery Süddeutsche Klassenlotterie (“SKL”) in violation of UK law). 
87. Id. ¶¶ 47–48, 52, 61 (regarding the legislation as not discriminatory on the 
basis of nationality). 
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(“Läärä”) again granted a national legislature great deference 
when it found a monopoly that completely eliminates 
competition and progress in the marketplace to be 
proportionate to the Finnish legislature’s goals of protecting 
consumers against the dangers of gambling and preventing 
fraud.88 Thus, some scholars have argued that with Läärä the 
CJEU adopted a “soft” proportionality test that grants Member 
States substantial discretion in promulgating restrictions on the 
gambling market.89 
Also in 1999, the CJEU issued a ruling to the Italian courts 
in Zenatti that emphasized the discretion granted to the Member 
States and did not examine the proportionality of the Italian 
regulations in depth.90 The CJEU found the Italian licensing 
restrictions to infringe on the freedom to provide services but 
did not find them impermissible.91 Limiting gambling to an 
exclusive group of operators could channel and control 
gambling opportunities, and this limitation could be acceptable 
if it reflects a desire to bring about “a genuine diminution in 
                                                                                                             
88. Markku Juhani Läärä, Cotswold Microsystems Ltd. and Oy Transatlantic 
Software Ltd. v. Kihlakunnansyyttäjä (Jyväskylä) and Suomen valtio (Finnish State) 
(Läärä), Case C-124/97, [1999] E.C.R. I-06067, ¶¶ 28–29, 31, 33, 42–43 (finding the 
monopoly not to be disproportionate or to “go beyond what is necessary in order to 
achieve” the legislature’s stated objectives). The case involved a British gaming 
machines exporter who was fined for selling machines without a license in Finland, 
where the Finnish government had granted a monopoly on slot machines to a non-
profit. Id. ¶¶ 3–6 (stating that the gaming machine monopoly license grant was specific 
to the distribution and operation of slot machines in Finland). 
89. See BARNARD, supra note 9, at 392 (“[I]n Läärä [the CJEU] did examine 
proportionality but its approach was remarkably hands off.”); see also Hörnle, supra 
note 83, at 9 (calling the proportionality analysis in Läärä “soft”); SPORTS BETTING, 
supra note 2, at 36 (discussing the CJEU’s stance on moral corruption in gambling and 
how easily it granted latitude to the national authorities). 
90. Zenatti, [1999] E.C.R. I-07289, ¶¶ 14–16, 33–34 (observing the deference 
granted to national authorities in regulating gambling activity and noting the need for 
proportionality without actually engaging in an analysis). In Zenatti, an Italian agent for 
a British bookmaker was found to violate the Italian regulations that limit sports betting 
to a small number of licensed operators. Id. ¶¶ 3–7 (outlining the regulatory scheme in 
Italy, which Mr. Zenatti was found by Italian authorities to be violating). The Italian 
legislation’s stated objectives were fraud prevention, consumer protection from the 
harms of gambling, and preventing gambling from being a source of private profit. Id. 
¶¶ 30–31 (summarizing policy objectives cited by the Italian legislation in 
implementing gambling regulations). 
91. Id. ¶¶ 26–27 (finding the legislation non-discriminatory but a restriction on 
the freedom to provide services). 
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gambling opportunities.”92 Furthermore, protecting the taxes 
levied on bookmaking in Italy must only be an “incidental 
beneficial consequence” and not the true purpose behind the 
legislation.93 
This line of cases granted a large margin of discretion to 
Member States. Here, the Member States were allowed to 
regulate gambling in contravention of the fundamental 
freedoms, and the CJEU sometimes did not even employ a 
proportionality analysis. 94  Following this highly deferential 
period, the CJEU developed the two conflicting compatibility 
frameworks discussed in Part II of this Note. 
3. The Treaty of Lisbon Comes into Force and the September 
8th German Triad 
The Treaty of Lisbon entered into force on December 1, 
2009, which altered the structure of the European Union in 
order to better face global challenges and uphold the core 
values of the European Union’s institutions.95 In light of this 
change, the Grand Chamber released a triad of rulings on 
gambling regulation compatibility in 2010 that realigned the 
CJEU’s judicial policy in this field after the two conflicting 
frameworks employed in Gambelli and in Santa Casa discussed in 
Part II of this Note.96 The German Triad reestablished the 
rigorous proportionality and consistency analyses employed in 
                                                                                                             
92. Id. ¶¶ 35–36 ([A] limitation is acceptable only if . . . it reflects a concern to 
bring about a genuine diminution in gambling opportunities . . . .”). 
93. Id. ¶ 36 (citing language in Schindler in claiming that financial benefits cannot 
be the primary motivation behind legislation that restricts the freedom to provide 
services). 
94. See Doukas & Anderson, supra note 60, at 240 (discussing the lack of a 
proportionality test in Schindler); see also SPORTS BETTING, supra note 2, at 34 (arguing 
the CJEU in Schindler “err[ed] on the side of national regulations and justifications” for 
restrictive licensing and monopolies). 
95. See Taking Europe into the 21st Century, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/lisbon_
treaty/take/index_en.htm (stating that in this ever more interconnected world, the 
Treaty of Lisbon alters the structures of the EU’s institutions and thus “the EU is more 
democratic and its core values are better served.”). 
96. See Winner Wetten GmBH, Bürgermeisterin der Stadt Bergheim (Winner 
Wetten), Case C-409/06, [2010] E.C.R. I-8015; see also Markus Stoß  v. Wetteraukreis 
(Stoß and Others), Joined Cases 316, 358–360, 409, & 410/07, [2010] E.C.R. I-8069; 
Carmen Media Group Ltd. v. Land Schleswig-Holstein, Innenminister des Landes 
Schleswig-Holstein (Carmen Media), Joined Cases 316, 358-360, 409, & 410/07, [2010] 
E.C.R. I-8149. 
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Gambelli and further reasserted the primacy of EU law.97 The 
Grand Chamber returned to a more faithful interpretation of 
the Treaties, allowing the Member States’ the ability to restrict 
the provision of services. 
On September 8, 2010, the Grand Chamber gave 
preliminary rulings in three major cases: Winner Wetten GmBH, 
Bürgermeisterin der Stadt Bergheim, Markus Stoȕ v. Wetteraukreis 
(“Stoȕ and Others”), and Carmen Media Group Ltd. v. Land 
Schleswig-Holstein, Innenminister des Landes Schleswig-Holstein. 98 
Winner Wetten dealt with the continued application of a German 
public monopoly statute during a transitional period to a 
regulatory scheme more compliant with EU law.99 In Stoȕ and 
Others, the defendants were agents of companies licensed in 
other Member States who were operating in Germany in 
contravention of the German monopoly system.100 In Carmen 
Media, the CJEU analyzed the compatibility of a total prohibition 
                                                                                                             
97. See SPORTS BETTING, supra note 2, at 74 (deeming Carmen Media a “pivotal 
moment” for the CJEU’s jurisprudence, the future of gambling in the European 
Union, and “an eventual liberalisation of the industry”); see also Winner Wetten, [2010] 
E.C.R. I-8149, ¶ 53 (“[I]n accordance with the principle of the precedence of Union 
law, provisions of the Treaty and directly applicable measures of the institutions have 
the effect, in their relations with the internal law of the Member States, merely by 
entering into force, of rendering automatically inapplicable any conflicting provision of 
national law.” (citing Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA, 
Case 106/77, [1978] E.C.R. 629, ¶ 17; The Queen v. Sec’y of State for Transp. ex parte 
Factortame, Case C-213/89,  [1990] E.C.R. I̻2433, ¶ 18)). 
98. See Winner Wetten, [2010] E.C.R. I-8149; see also Stoß and Others, Joined Cases 
316, 358-360, 409, & 410/07, [2010] E.C.R. I-8069; Carmen Media, [2010] E.C.R. I-8149. 
99. Winner Wetten, [2010] E.C.R. I-8149, ¶¶ 63–67 (describing caselaw that allows 
for the continued application of a national law found to be incompatible to EU law for 
an interim period but finding that inapplicable to the case at hand). The gambling 
operator Winner Wetten was found to be operating in violation of the German non-
profit monopoly grant. Id. ¶¶ 15–18 (describing Winner Wetten, a gambling operator 
established in Malta, and the company’s administrative complaint brought against 
German officials). Winner Wetten again raised the issue of inconsistency because the 
German authorities advertised and encouraged consumers to use their gambling 
services while claiming to pursue the overriding objective of consumer protection. Id. 
¶ 20 (citing the national court’s consideration of the inconsistency between a restrictive 
consumer protection policy and encouraging consumers to participate in the 
authorized gambling activities). 
100. Stoß and Others, [2010] E.C.R. I-8069, ¶¶ 14, 16, 28–30 (outlining the factual 
and legal background of the preliminary ruling and finding the multiple defendants to 
be agents of companies operating without authorization in Germany) . 
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on online gambling with the German monopoly system during 
its transitional period.101 
Most notably, the Grand Chamber in Winner Wetten began 
the discussion of the substance of the law with a forceful 
reiteration of the idea of primacy: provisions of the Treaty and 
secondary law automatically render inapplicable any conflicting 
national legislation.102 Moreover, the Grand Chamber discussed 
the principle of cooperation, which obligates Member States to 
apply EU law.103 Thus, the ruling—that the public monopoly 
regulation was a restriction that could not continue to apply 
during a transitional period because the regulation did not 
consistently and systematically limit gambling—came as no 
surprise.104 
The Grand Chamber’s September 8th German Triad 
rulings reaffirm the primacy of EU law in Winner Wetten and 
establish that a Member State, here Germany, cannot violate EU 
law even briefly. In Stoȕ and Others and Carmen Media, the Grand 
Chamber stressed the importance of consistency in the means of 
national gambling regulation to the legislature’s stated 
objectives.105 Any restriction of the free provision of services 
must be consistent and proportionate to the stated overriding 
                                                                                                             
101 . Carmen Media, [2010] E.C.R. I-8149, ¶¶ 23–24, 111 (detailing the 
unsuccessful license application of Gibraltar-based online gambling operator Carmen 
Media in Land Schleswig-Holstein, in the context of transitional measures applied at 
the time of the challenge in Germany). 
102 . Winner Wetten, [2010] E.C.R. I-8149, ¶ 53 (“[I]n accordance with the 
principle of the precedence of Union law, provisions of the Treaty and directly 
applicable measures of the institutions have the effect, in their relations with the 
internal law of the Member States, merely by entering into force, of rendering 
automatically inapplicable any conflicting provision of national law.” (citing Simmenthal, 
[1978] E.C.R. 629, ¶ 17; The Queen v. Sec’y of State for Transp. ex parte Factortame, [1990] 
E.C.R. I̻2433, ¶ 18)). 
103. Id. ¶ 55 (holding that Member States are obligated to apply Union law under 
the principle of cooperation (citing Simmenthal, [1978] E.C.R. 629, ¶¶ 16, 21; 
Factortame, [1990] E.C.R. I̻2433, ¶ 19)). 
104. Id. ¶ 69 (finding the regulation to be a restriction on the freedom of 
establishment and the free provision of services). 
105. Though the CJEU in Stoß and Others found that a monopoly also could be 
justified because it allows greater control over the gambling sector and its inherent 
risks, it could only be justified in the context of a high level of consumer protection 
that the regulation consistently and systematically pursues. Stoß and Others, [2010] 
E.C.R. I-8069, ¶¶ 83, 95–98 (holding restrictions on gambling activities can only be 
justified only consistently and systematically pursuing an overriding public policy). 
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public policy.106 The CJEU reaffirmed, however, its belief that 
mutual recognition was inapplicable to the field of gambling 
regulation at this point in time.107 Again, the CJEU reiterated 
the unique risks associated with gambling online and posited 
that in light of this, regulating this channel of gambling in a 
different manner may be justified.108  
4. The Closer Examination of Policy Objectives and the 
Reinforcement of the Principle of Non-discrimination 
In accordance with this judicial posture, the Fourth 
Chamber and Eighth Chamber released rulings from 2010 to 
2012 calling for consistency and more evidence of the necessity 
of gambling regulations in Member States. Furthermore, the 
CJEU took a firm stance against gambling regulations that 
discriminated on the basis of nationality. On September 9, 2010, 
one day after the Grand Chamber handed down three 
preliminary rulings regarding the German regulatory scheme, 
the Fourth Chamber issued a preliminary ruling regarding 
                                                                                                             
106. See Carmen Media, [2010] E.C.R. I-8149, ¶ 63 (finding disparities in gambling 
regulation, for example, where certain games are subject to a public monopoly and 
others to a licensing system, does not render the regulation unsuitable). It is within the 
Member State’s discretion to determine if it is necessary to prohibit or restrict 
gambling activities. Id. ¶ 46 (granting discretion to the Member States to determine 
what regulation is necessary and finding the necessity and proportionality must “be 
assessed having regard to the objectives pursued and the level of protection 
sought . . . .”). However, the CJEU in Stoß and Others and Carmen Media was particularly 
concerned with inconsistent advertisements for monopolies that trivialized gambling or 
gave it a positive image, especially if the legislature’s stated objective is reduction of 
gambling. Stoß and Others, [2010] E.C.R. I-8069, ¶ 103 (concluding that advertising to 
channel consumers cannot trivialize gambling and give the activity a positive image); 
Carmen Media, [2010] E.C.R. I-8149, ¶ 71 (regarding the expansionist policy unsuitable 
for pursuing a reduction in gambling opportunities). 
107. See Stoß and Others, [2010] E.C.R. I-8069, ¶¶ 109–10, 112 (rejecting the 
application of mutual recognition in this context and finding the question 
inappropriate because “a duty mutually to recognise authorisations issued by the 
various Member States cannot exist having regard to the current state of EU law”). 
108. Carmen Media, [2010] E.C.R. I-8149, ¶ 111 (holding that a ban on online 
gambling may be a suitable means of protecting consumers and fighting gambling 
addiction); see also id. ¶¶ 101–03 (highlighting particular risks associated with online 
gambling—especially the lack of direct contact, the ease of access, the round-the-clock 
availability, the isolation, the anonymity, and the absence of social control); Stoß and 
Others, [2010] E.C.R. I-8069, ¶ 84 (indicating the referring national court was 
apprehensive about applying the public monopoly framework to the Internet where 
compliance may be harder to ensure). 
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Austrian regulations in Ernst Engelmann.109 The following year, 
in 2011, the Eighth Chamber issued a preliminary ruling in 
Zeturf Ltd. v. Premier Ministre regarding the French non-profit 
horserace-betting monopoly. 110  The same year, the Fourth 
Chamber issued a ruling in Dickinger & Ömer, stating as in Zeturf 
that in order to find a monopoly justified and necessary, the 
regulations must guarantee a “particularly high level of 
protection.”111 In February 2012, the Fourth Chamber again 
issued a preliminary ruling on online gambling regulations in 
Costa & Cifone, in which protectionist Italian licensing law 
required a minimum distance between existing operators and 
previous applicants.112 This series of rulings adhered closely to 
                                                                                                             
109. Ernst Engelmann, Case C-64/08, [2010] E.C.R. I-8219, ¶¶ 2–3. In Engelmann, a 
German national was operating gambling in Austria in contravention of Austrian 
legislation. Id. ¶¶ 17–18 (outlining the factual background of the dispute in the main 
proceedings). Here, the CJEU found the Austrian regulation of gambling to be 
discriminatory and disproportionate and therefore incompatible with EU law. Id. ¶¶ 
28, 32–37 (finding the regulation a restriction on the freedom of establishment, 
specifically secondary establishment in Austria, and discriminatory against businesses 
headquartered in other Member States). 
110. Zeturf, [2011] 3 C.M.L.R. 30, ¶¶ 1–2, 26–27 (describing the appeal to the 
French government by Zeturf, a Maltese-licensed online operator that provided 
horserace-betting services via the Internet in France, to repeal the monopoly grant). 
Note that at the time of this ruling, the French legislation at issue had already been 
amended to a licensing scheme, but the ruling nevertheless stands for the principle 
that Member States must maintain consistency and provide support for the harms cited 
on the record. See Commission, On-line Gambling: Commission Welcomes France’s 
Decision to Open Its Gambling Market and Closes Infringement Procedure, 
IP/10/1597 (2010); see also Loi n. 2010-476 de mai 2010 relative à l’ouverture à la 
concurrence et à la régulation du sectuer des jeux d’argent et de hasard en ligne [Law 
2010-476 of May 12, 2010 on the Introduction of Competition and Sector Regulation of 
Gambling and Online Gambling], available at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affich
Texte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000022204510  (allowing cross-border provision of 
services through a licensing system as opposed to the previous monopoly system). 
111. Dickinger & Ömer, [2011] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 54 (delivered Sept. 15, 2011) (not 
yet reported) (holding that it is for the referring court to determine the intent, 
objectives, and necessity of the restrictive regulations). The defendants alleged that the 
primary objective of the Austrian legislature was increasing tax revenue, whereas the 
government asserted that its main objective was consumer protection. Id. ¶¶ 2–5, 26, 
52–53, 80–81, 84 (discussing the allegations of the defendants in the case who operated 
the Maltese licensed website bet-at-home.com in contravention of Austrian law that, 
among other things, (1) required the seat of the operation to be in Austria, (2) 
considered the maximization of public revenue when awarding concessions, and (3) 
prohibited setting up branches in other Member States) 
112. Costa & Cifone, Joined Cases 72 & 77/10, [2011] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 58, 66, 89 
(delivered Feb. 16, 2012) (not yet reported) (describing the Italian licensing law and 
discussing the measures as protectionist). Mr. Costa and Mr. Cifone were agents of 
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the principles laid down in the Treaties and the text of Articles 
56 and 61. 
This series of rulings by the CJEU is faithful to Articles 56 
and 61 because the rulings stress the principle of non-
discrimination and the need for transparency.113 The Treaty of 
Lisbon calls for the free provision of services and allows 
restrictions on the provision of services in the public interest 
only if they did not discriminate on the basis of nationality.114 
Here, the CJEU called for more facts on the record to 
demonstrate the harms linked to gambling in France and 
Austria.115 The CJEU again demanded consistency between the 
objectives cited by the national legislatures and the means 
chosen to execute these objectives.116 The call for more evidence 
                                                                                                             
Stanley International operating in Italy. Id. ¶ 2. In breach of EU law, Stanley 
International was previously excluded from the Italian tendering procedure in 1999, 
and in 2006, after the Italian authorities were uncooperative in tendering procedures, 
brought suit. Id. ¶¶ 12–13, 20–27. 
113 . Engelmann, [2010] E.C.R. I-8219, ¶¶ 32–33 (holding that regulations 
requiring a gambling company to have its seat in Austria are discriminatory against 
companies established in other Member States and a restriction against free 
establishment in Austria); see Doukas, supra note 60, at 262 (finding the regulations in 
Engelmann “manifest excesses of national discretion” incompatible with the Treaty); 
Engelmann, [2010] E.C.R. I-8219, ¶¶ 37–39, 49–58 (finding the Austrian regulation 
disproportionate as there are other methods available to monitor operator’s activities—
especially via the Internet—and emphasizing the lack of transparency in the license-
tendering procedures because they were not based on objective criteria known in 
advance, that is neither used arbitrary nor applied in a discriminatory manner); Costa 
& Cifone, [2011] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 54–56 (delivered Feb. 16, 2012) (demanding that 
national authorities comply with the principles of equal treatment and non-
discrimination in tendering procedures and maintain transparency). All rules and 
requirements of the tendering procedure ought to be clear and precise so that 
applicants have all the relevant information on hand when considering their tender 
offer. Id. ¶ 73. This principle is further bolstered by the principle of legal certainty, 
which calls for predictability in the law. Id. ¶ 74. 
114. See TFEU, supra note 2, art. 56 (ex art. 49 TEC), 2012 O.J. C 326, at 70 
(enacting the free provision of services); see also id. art. 61 (ex art. 54 TEC), at 71 
(allowing derogations from article 56 so long as the regulations do not discriminate on 
the basis of nationality). 
115. Zeturf, [2011] 3 C.M.L.R. 30, ¶¶ 70, 72 (instructing the French national court 
to determine whether, at the time the regulation was promulgated, there was evidence 
that criminal and fraudulent activities linked to gambling were an issue in France); see 
Dickinger & Ömer, [2011] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 67 (delivered Sept. 15, 2011) (arguing an 
expansionist policy in Austria is inconsistent with the objective of consumer protection 
unless the scale of criminal activity is “significant”). 
116. Dickinger & Ömer, [2011] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 69 (delivered Sept. 15, 2011) 
(stating that there is a difference between a “restrained commercial policy seeking only 
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of the scale of the harms cited on the legislative record is 
indicative of the more protective stance the CJEU is taking on 
the fundamental freedoms. 
5. The Potential Resurrection of the Principle of Mutual 
Recognition 
In July 2012, the Fourth Chamber issued two important 
preliminary rulings dealing with Austrian and Latvian gambling 
regulation. In HIT and HIT LARIX v. Bundesminister für Finanzen, 
the CJEU’s ruling regarding advertising in Austria for Slovenian 
casinos laid the foundation for the potential application of 
mutual recognition in the gambling sector.117 Furthermore, in 
Garkalns SIA v. Rīgas dome, the CJEU called for a probing inquiry 
into the Latvian authorities’ intent and objective in restricting 
the provision of gambling services in Riga.118 This analysis of the 
consistency and proportionality of the national legislature’s 
motives, coupled with the consideration of other neighboring 
Member States’ interests, is more faithful to the European 
Union ideal and economic goals. 
In HIT and HIT Larix the CJEU determined that the 
Austrian government cannot require other government’s 
regulations to be identical to Austrian regulations, and it cannot 
assume that other Member States’ regulations do not afford the 
same degree of consumer protection.119 The CJEU stated that 
national gambling regulations established to be essentially 
                                                                                                             
to capture or retain the existing market” and a policy seeking to expand the overall 
market). 
117. HIT and HIT LARIX v. Bundesminister für Finanzen (HIT and HIT LARIX), 
Case C-176/11, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 2–9 (delivered July 12, 2012) (not yet reported) 
(describing the background of the dispute where two Slovenian gambling operators 
applied for Austrian advertising permits and were rejected because the authorities 
found the Slovenian regulations less protective—a reason the CJEU found inadequate). 
118. Garkalns SIA v. Rīgas dome (Garkalns SIA), Case C-470/11, [2012] E.C.R. 
I____, ¶¶ 1–2, 33 (delivered July 19, 2012) (not yet reported) (outlining the facts of the 
proceedings concerning the Rīga authorities’ refusal to grant Latvian operator 
Garkalns a license to operate an amusement arcade in a densely populated part of 
Riga). 
119. HIT and HIT LARIX, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 32 (delivered July 12, 2012) 
(stating that Slovenian regulations against gambling cannot be required to be identical 
to regulations in Austria and regarding the difference between national regulations as 
inadequate grounds for rejecting an advertising application); see Santa Casa, [2009] 
E.C.R. I-7633, ¶¶ 69–70 (rejecting the application of mutual recognition in the online 
gambling field). 
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equivalent is more loyal to the Treaties’ economic goal of 
establishing a free market than allowing disparate and 
discordant regulation. 
6. Member States Have Two Options for Compliance: Reform or 
Liberalize 
In 2013, the CJEU dealt with two major compatibility 
challenges in the gambling regulation field. In Stanleybet et al. v. 
Ypourgos Oikonomias kai Oikonomikon, the Fourth Chamber found 
the Greek monopoly system would likely be found incompatible 
with the Treaty of Lisbon, and the CJEU made the explicit policy 
recommendation to either overhaul the monopoly system or 
move to a more liberal licensing system.120 Most importantly, the 
Third Chamber in Biasci and Others found that a national 
regulation that bars cross-border provision of gambling services 
is inherently incompatible with the Treaty of Lisbon.121 In Biasci 
and Others and Stanleybet, the CJEU has been increasingly willing 
to make policy recommendations and accord less deference to 
the national legislatures in determining gambling regulations. 
The CJEU’s more active position coincides with the 
Commission’s reopening of infringement proceedings against a 
number of Member States.122 In Biasci and Others and Stanleybet, 
the CJEU is working in tandem with the Commission to uphold 
the fundamental freedoms and the Treaty of Lisbon. 
                                                                                                             
120. Stanleybet et. al. v. Ypourgos Oikonomias kai Oikonomikon (Stanleybet), 
Joined Cases 186 & 209/11, [2013] E.C.R. I____ (delivered Jan. 24, 2013), ¶ 36, 46–47 
(finding the Greek grant of a monopoly to OPAP impermissible under EU law, 
especially where the monopoly is not “genuinely meet[ing] the concern to reduce 
opportunities for gambling.”). OPAP is an operator listed on the Athens Stock 
Exchange with the State shareholding never falling below a 34% stake in the company. 
Id. ¶¶ 6-7, 12. The State also retained the right to appoint the majority of the members 
of the board of directors of OPAP even though it was a minority shareholder. Id. ¶ 12. 
The majority of the Greek national court believes that the OPAP monopoly scheme is 
incompatible with EU law because there is no stated objective that justifies the strict 
scheme and the expansion of gambling in Greece has been uncontrolled. Id. ¶ 17. 
121 . Biasci and Others, Joined Cases 660/11 & 8/12, [2013] E.C.R. I____ 
(delivered Sept. 12, 2013) (not yet reported), ¶¶ 12–13 (considering again the Italian 
licensing scheme where applicants were agents of Austrian online gambling operator 
Goldbet and holding the legislation incompatible because it precluded all cross-border 
gambling activity). 
122. See supra notes 69–72 and accompanying text (discussing the reopening of 
infringement proceedings against noncompliant Member States). 
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The Fourth Chamber in Stanleybet made a policy 
recommendation to the Greek legislature: either reform the 
current monopoly system to control gambling or change over to 
a liberalized licensing scheme that may better protect 
consumers.123 A licensing system would allow the Member State 
to retain discretion but would open up the market to controlled 
competition. In Biasci and Others, the Third Chamber firmly 
stated that prohibiting all cross-border gambling services is 
incompatible with EU law, though it reestablished the current 
inapplicability of mutual recognition.124 Moreover, the CJEU 
emphasized the need for transparency and that economic 
protectionism cannot justify a restriction on free trade.125 
Most recently, in April 2014, the CJEU decided the case of 
Pfleger and Others, which largely followed the opinion released by 
AG Eleanor Sharpston.126 Continuing with the active line of 
reasoning in Stanleybet and Biasci and Others, the CJEU found the 
regulations in Pfleger and Others inconsistent and 
disproportionate with the Austrian legislature’s consumer 
protection objectives due to the apparent true purpose of 
increasing tax revenues and the aggressive advertising campaign 
the government is currently undertaking.127 Notably, the CJEU 
                                                                                                             
123. Stanleybet, [2013] E.C.R. I___ (delivered Jan. 24, 2013), ¶¶ 45–47 (advising 
that, although “free, undistorted competition” might have negative effects, a Member 
State has two policy choices: reform a monopoly to make it compatible or consider that 
liberalization of the market better ensures consumer protection in a system like an 
administrative permit scheme). 
124. Biasci and Others, [2013] E.C.R. I___ (delivered Sept. 12, 2013), ¶¶ 37, 40–43 
(drawing a red line finding that a national legislation that precludes all cross-border 
gambling activities is incompatible with EU law and re-establishing that there is no 
obligation of mutual recognition of licenses issued by other Member States). 
125. Id. ¶¶ 31–33, 38 (requiring that licensing procedures be transparent and 
“clear, precise and unequivocal” and reiterating the holding from Costa & Cifone that 
economic protectionism is not an overriding policy objective). 
126. Pfleger and Others, Case 390/12, [2014] E.C.R. I____ (delivered on Apr. 30, 
2014); see also Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Pfleger and Others, Case C-
390/12, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 25 (delivered Nov. 14, 2013) (discussing case involving 
the Austrian gaming machine license regulations and their proportionality). 
127. Pfleger and Others, [2014] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 54, 56 (delivered on Apr. 30, 2014) 
(concluding that Article 56 TFEU precludes the Austrian regulations because the 
regulations, whose “real purpose” is increasing tax revenue, do not consistently and 
systematically pursue the cited consumer protection objectives); see Opinion of 
Advocate General Sharpston, Pfleger and Others, [2014] E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 53–54 
(delivered on Apr. 30, 2014) (noting the CJEU holds increasing revenues cannot justify 
restricting the freedom to provide services and that the referring court found hypocrisy 
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confirmed for the first time that the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union applies where the free provision 
of services is unjustifiably restricted.128 In these three cases, the 
CJEU is increasingly working in harmony with the Commission, 
which reopened infringement proceedings, to help the 
Commission fulfill its role as guardian of the Treaties. 
II. THE CJEU’S APPROACH TO ONLINE GAMBLING 
Part II summarizes the CJEU’s competing approaches to 
the compatibility analysis of gambling regulations with the 
Treaty and European Union laws and examines whether the 
CJEU’s analysis is true to the underlying principles of the EU 
internal market. Beginning with Gambelli in 2003, Part II.A 
discusses the CJEU’s close examination of the consistency and 
the proportionality of the means of Member States’ gambling 
regulations with the ends sought to be achieved, an analysis that 
vigorously polices Member States’ restrictions on the freedom to 
provide services. In contrast, Part II.B compares the analysis in 
Gambelli and Placanica with the CJEU’s reversion to a more 
deferential stance in the 2009 Santa Casa ruling, which is 
unfaithful to the fundamental freedoms of the Treaty of Lisbon 
and coincided with a lull in the Commission’s infringement 
proceedings. 
A. The Stricter Assessment Outlined by the CJEU in Gambelli and 
Placanica 
Beginning in 2003 with the CJEU’s preliminary ruling in 
Gambelli, the CJEU undertook a probing analysis of the Member 
States’ means and ends in restricting gambling within their 
nation’s borders. Three cases—Gambelli, Lindman, and 
Placanica129—laid down a compatibility framework that ratcheted 
                                                                                                             
in the stated objectives and the “colossal expenditure” on “aggressive” advertising, 
which the CJEU has found inconsistent in the past (citing Dickinger & Ömer, [2011] 
E.C.R. I____, ¶¶ 58, 68)). 
128. Pfleger and Others, [2014] E.C.R. I___, ¶ 59 (delivered on Apr. 30, 2014) 
(supporting the AGs finding that an unjustified restriction on the free provision of 
services is impermissible under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union). 
129. Gambelli, [2003] E.C.R. I-13031; see Lindman, [2003] E.C.R. I-13543; Placanica, 
[2007] E.C.R. I-1891. 
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up the proportionality and consistency analyses and gave less 
deference to national legislatures in comparison to the previous 
stance iterated in Schindler and Zenatti.130 In this way, these three 
cases signal the CJEU’s greater adherence to the tenets of the 
internal market and the Treaties.131 
In its 2003 decision Gambelli, the CJEU questioned and 
examined the actual motive behind a Member State’s restrictive 
regulation. There, the defendants were betting agents 
representing a British gambling operator, Stanley International, 
and were found to be acting in violation of the strict licensing 
scheme under Italian regulation.132 The CJEU found the Italian 
legislation, which criminalized unlicensed gambling operations, 
to be a restriction on the freedom of establishment and the 
freedom to provide services called for by the Treaties.133 The 
Italian legislation made it “impossible in practice” for public 
companies in other Member States to be licensed in Italy, and it 
was thus a restriction on the freedom of establishment.134 
The CJEU also challenged the proportionality and necessity 
of the criminal penalties imposed on the defendant’s betting 
agents, especially considering the advertising campaigns run by 
                                                                                                             
130. See Hörnle, supra note 83, at 11 (arguing that Gambelli took a more “pro-
active stance” in questioning and analyzing the proportionality of the Italian 
legislation); see also Alain-Laurent Verbeke, Gambling Regulation in Europe: Moving 
Beyond Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, in IN THE SHADOW OF LUXEMBOURG 254 (Alan Littler et 
al. eds., 2011) (stating that Gambelli and Placanica signal a swing in the pendulum 
towards a stricter analysis than Schindler et al.); Schindler, [1994] E.C.R. I-1078; Zenatti, 
[1999] E.C.R. I-07289.  
131. See SPORTS BETTING, supra note 2, at 29 (recognizing Placanica to be “strong 
confirmation” that there was a “clear turn towards liberalisation of the gambling sector 
in Europe”) 
132. Gambelli, [2003] E.C.R. I-13031, ¶ 10 (describing the factual background of 
the case). 
133. Id. ¶ 76 (holding that the Italian legislation that imposes criminal penalties 
on violators of the licensing scheme is a restriction on the freedom of establishment 
and the freedom to provide services under EU law). But see Doukas & Anderson, supra 
note 60, at 237 (finding that though the CJEU found the regulation a restriction, the 
national court found the betting scheme proportionate and justified (citing Corte 
Supreme di Cassazione (Sezioni Unite Penali), Judgment No. 111/04 of 26 April 2004 
(Gesualdi), available at http://www.cortedicassazione.it/Notizie/Giurisprudenza
Comunitaria/CorteGiustizia/Scheda.asp?ID=473)). 
134. Gambelli, [2003] E.C.R. I-13031, ¶ 48 (contending that the Italian legislation 
functionally made it “impossible” for companies quoted on markets in other Member 
States to obtain a license in Italy and therefore restricted the freedom of 
establishment). 
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the Italian government that encouraged consumption of Italy’s 
own licensed gambling services.135 The CJEU found that the 
government’s policy of expansion and advertisement was 
inconsistent with consumer protection concerns, such as 
reduction of the opportunity to gamble.136 The CJEU concluded 
that restrictions on gambling services must limit betting activities 
in “a consistent and systematic manner,” and found the 
expansionist policy of the Italian government with respect to 
domestic gambling operations to undermine this consistency.137 
The CJEU also questioned whether the exclusion of listed 
companies from license-tendering proceedings is discriminatory 
against these companies because there are other less-restrictive 
ways of preventing fraud.138 Furthermore, the judgment stressed 
that prevention of decreasing tax revenue is not an overriding 
general interest that can justify the restriction of fundamental 
freedoms.139 This more searching analysis than the one the 
CJEU employed in Schindler, Läärä, and Zenatti of the gambling 
regulation’s proportionality echoed points that had been raised, 
but not discussed at length, in the earlier preliminary ruling on 
Italian gambling regulation in Zenatti.140 
Decided just six days after Gambelli in 2003, the Fifth 
Chamber of the Court considered the compatibility of a Finnish 
gambling regulation in Lindman. 141  Ms. Lindman, a Finnish 
national residing in Finland, won money in a Swedish lottery 
while on holiday and disputed the taxes levied on her winnings 
by Finland on the grounds that winnings from Finnish lotteries 
                                                                                                             
135. Id. ¶ 72 (urging the national court to view the necessity analysis in the 
context of the harsh, disproportionate criminal penalties and the advertising scheme 
employed by the state). 
136. Id. ¶¶ 68–69 (considering the expansionist policy to be inconsistent with 
consumer protection objectives). 
137. Id. ¶ 67 (outlining that restrictions must serve the policy objectives in a 
“consistent and systematic manner”). 
138. Id. ¶ 74 (questioning the Italian legislature’s course of action where there are 
other means of preventing criminal activities in the gambling sector). 
139. Id. ¶¶ 61, 69 (noting that it is “settled case-law that the diminution or 
reduction of tax revenue” is not an overriding policy justification under EU law). 
140. See Zenatti, [1999] E.C.R. I-07289; supra notes 93–94 (discussing the need for 
gambling regulation to bring about a “genuine diminution in gambling opportunities” 
and for financial benefits to only be “incidental” to the other policy objectives of the 
legislation). 
141. Lindman, [2003] E.C.R. I-13543. 
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are exempt from tax.142 Here, the Fifth Chamber found the tax 
regulation discriminatory as it gave preference to Finnish lottery 
winnings over taxable foreign lottery winnings. 143  The Fifth 
Chamber also found the Finnish legislation lacked support on 
the record for its stated social objectives and, thus, the Treaty 
prohibited the discriminatory law.144 
In 2007, the CJEU, once again, examined the compatibility 
of Italian legislation. 145  In Placanica, Stanley International 
challenged Italy’s limited licensing system as a restriction on the 
freedom to provide services. 146  The CJEU stated that while 
Member States can set policy objectives in regulating gambling, 
each restrictive measure of the regulation must be subjected to a 
proportionality test.147 Again, the CJEU chastised the Italian 
legislature for pursuing an expansionist policy with respect to 
domestically licensed gambling where the aim was to increase 
tax revenue, and criticized the legislation for failing to cite any 
real justifications.148 In addition, the CJEU found that there were 
less restrictive ways to prevent fraud than the licensing 
procedure that imposed criminal penalties, and concluded that 
the Treaty prohibited the legislation.149 Here, the CJEU openly 
recommended that the Italian legislature either revoke and 
                                                                                                             
142. Id. ¶¶ 2, 7–11 (outlining the question presented and the factual background 
of the dispute). 
143. Id. ¶ 21 (holding that the Finnish legislation clearly discriminates against 
other Member States’ lotteries). 
144. Id. ¶ 27 (finding the Finnish legislation incompatible with EU law as it is 
discriminatory). 
145. Placanica, [2007] E.C.R. I-1891 (issued by the Grand Chamber of the Court 
of Justice). 
146. Id. ¶¶ 43–44 (considering the Italian licensing scheme already considered in 
Gambelli to be a restriction on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to 
provide services); see Doukas & Anderson, supra note 60, at 247 (calling Stanley 
International’s challenge unsurprising because the latitude Italy enjoyed in regulating 
against crime in gambling allowed the regulation to serve as a pretext that primarily 
served Italy’s “economic interests and budgetary considerations”). 
147. Placanica, [2007] E.C.R. I-1891, ¶¶ 48–49 (“[A]lthough the Member States 
are free to set the objectives of policy . . . the restrictive measures that they impose must 
nevertheless satisfy the conditions laid down in the case-law of the CJEU as regards 
their proportionality.”). 
148. Id. ¶ 54 (criticizing the Italian legislature for failing to cite a policy objective 
such as reduction of gambling activity or limiting gambling opportunities). 
149. Id. ¶¶ 62–64 (citing the AG’s Opinion in point 125 for alternative and less-
restrictive means of regulating gambling and preventing fraud). 
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redistribute the old licenses or open tenders on new licenses.150 
Furthermore, the CJEU found that Italy could not apply 
criminal penalties to the defendants where Italy had refused to 
grant Stanley International a license in breach of Community 
law.151 
In these cases, the CJEU reconsidered the significant 
deference granted to national legislatures in earlier preliminary 
rulings on gambling activity. The CJEU’s more searching 
analysis of the consistency and proportionality of gambling 
regulations to social objectives is truer to the underlying 
principles of the free market and the Treaty of Lisbon.152 The 
thorough analysis of the national legislature’s true objectives 
employed in Gambelli and Placanica is more in accordance with 
the Treaty restrictions.153 Moreover, the CJEU stresses in Gambelli 
that economic protectionism is not a valid justification for 
restricting one of the fundamental freedoms.154 The stricter 
proportionality and consistency framework applied in these 
rulings allow Member States to frame a national gambling policy 
while still honoring the principles of the internal market. 
B. A New Leniency and the Rejection of Mutual Recognition 
Two years after the decision in Placanica, the CJEU fell back 
to its former position of deference to the national legislatures 
                                                                                                             
150. Id. ¶ 63 (finding an “appropriate course of action could be the revocation 
and redistribution of the old licences or the award by public tender of an adequate 
number of new licences”). 
151. Id. ¶¶ 68–71 (rejecting the application of a criminal penalty for failing to 
fulfill an administrative formality that was made impossible by the Member State itself). 
152. See Doukas and Anderson, supra note 60, at 245–46 (describing the CJEU as 
“anxious to circumscribe” Member State discretion considering the severity of Italian 
laws and the fact that fundamental freedoms are being restricted due to concerns 
about “the human passion for gambling” and associated criminality); see also Verbeke, 
supra note 130, at 253–54 (finding the thorough analysis of consistency and 
proportionality to be a stricter analysis of the respect given by Member States to the 
supremacy of fundamental European principles). 
153. See Hörnle, supra note 83, at 11–14 (citing the questioning of the “actual” 
objectives of the Italian legislature in Gambelli as particularly thorough and finding that 
Placanica gave the Italian court clear guidance and little room for maneuvering in its 
judgment); see also Verbeke, supra note 130, at 254 (stating that Gambelli and Placanica 
signal a swing in the pendulum towards a stricter analysis than Schindler et al.). 
154. Gambelli, [2003] E.C.R. I-13031, ¶¶ 61, 69 (noting that it is “settled case-law” 
that neither tax protectionism nor economic protectionism may serve as justifications 
for restricting a fundamental freedom). 
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with respect to gambling regulation.155 The CJEU no longer 
engaged in a proportionality analysis and generally yielded to 
the Member States’ legislatures.156 Moreover, the CJEU explicitly 
rejected the idea of applying mutual recognition in this field 
due to the unique risks posed by gambling, even though mutual 
recognition has been applied with success in other complex 
fields such as medical services.157 The CJEU’s deference to the 
Member States despite the fact that the regulations at issue 
potentially could be found disproportionate—the cases at hand 
involve monopoly grants and total bans on gambling 
advertisement—does not honor the principles of the Treaties 
and fundamental freedoms.158 
The Grand Chamber of the Court issued another 
preliminary ruling in 2009 regarding the Portuguese monopoly 
grant in the preliminary ruling for Santa Casa.159 The Portuguese 
legislature had for many years granted a monopoly to the non-
profit Departamento de Jogos da Santa Casa da Misericórdia de 
Lisboa (“Santa Casa”) and had extended this monopoly to 
online gambling operations. 160  Bwin, an online gambling 
operator based in Gibraltar, entered into a sponsorship 
agreement with the First Football Division (the “Liga”) in 
                                                                                                             
155. See SPORTS BETTING, supra note 2, at 53–60 (describing the “shockwave 
[sent] across the continent and beyond” by the decision in Santa Casa that was a break 
from the law after Placanica and stating that Santa Casa “perplexed” matters post-
Gambelli and Placanica). 
156. See SPORTS BETTING, supra note 2, at 29, (citing the Santa Casa judgment on 
September 8, 2009 as “a day that delivered a significant blow to the private gambling 
sector”); see also Dawes & Struckmann, supra note 12, at 261 (concluding that Santa 
Casa was a “disappointment” of a judgment that did not engage in a detailed analysis of 
the facts and resulted in a ruling based on “a profound misunderstanding of factual 
reality”). 
157. See Santa Casa, [2009] E.C.R. I-7633, ¶¶ 69–70 (rejecting the application of 
mutual recognition in the online gambling field); see also Dawes & Struckmann, supra 
note 12, at 260 (arguing there is “no apparent reason” why mutual recognition cannot 
apply to the field of online gambling). 
158. See Doukas & Anderson, supra note 60, at 276 (arguing that the deference 
granted Member States allows for “de jure or de facto monopolistic or oligopolistic 
organization” of the gambling market and creates a “game reserve for the exploitation 
of Member States.”); see also Dawes & Struckmann, supra note 12, at 243 (arguing that 
the CJEU’s approach in Santa Casa was “misguided” in light of precedent and 
“economic reality.”). 
159. Santa Casa, [2009] E.C.R. I-7633, ¶¶ 1–3 (describing the legal background of 
the case). 
160. Id. ¶¶ 3–11 (outlining the gambling regulation framework in Portugal). 
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Portugal for the 2005–2006 season.161 Shortly thereafter, Bwin 
and the Liga were fined for promoting, organizing, and 
operating Internet gambling in contravention of the Portuguese 
monopoly legislation. 162  The CJEU found the monopoly 
legislation to be a restriction on the freedom to provide services, 
but one that is justified in the pursuit of fraud prevention.163 
Here, the CJEU highlighted the unique risks posed by online 
gambling—namely, the lack of direct contact between 
consumers and operators—and rejected the possibility of 
mutual recognition.164  
In 2010, the CJEU issued at least seven preliminary rulings 
on gambling regulations in the European Union, commencing 
with the rulings issued on the same day in June by the Second 
Chamber.165 Ladbrokes Ltd. v. Stichting de Nationale Sporttolisator 
concerned the British company’s operation of gambling via the 
Internet in the Netherlands in contravention of the exclusive 
monopoly granted to the non-profit De Lotto by Dutch law.166 
Similarly, Sporting Exchange Ltd. (t/a Betfair) v. Minister van Justitie 
concerned the British online gambling operator’s unsuccessful 
attempt to procure a license in the Netherlands.167 Both rulings 
found the monopoly grant to the non-profit De Lotto to be a 
restriction on the freedom to provide services.168 Both rulings 
also stated, however, that national authorities must be given a 
margin of discretion, in the context of moral, religious, or 
                                                                                                             
161. Id. ¶¶ 20, 25 (summarizing the online gambling operator Bwin’s actions at 
issue). 
162. Id. ¶ 26 (discussing the fines imposed on Bwin and the First Football Division 
(“Liga”)). 
163. Id. ¶¶ 54, 62–67, 73 (finding the regulations to be a restriction on the 
freedom to provide services that is justified by the legislature’s cited objective of crime 
prevention). 
164. Id. ¶¶ 69–70 (finding that even though Bwin is licensed in another Member 
State, Portugal is entitled to find this insufficient assurance that Portuguese consumers 
would be protected against fraud and crime). 
165. See Betfair, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. 41. 
166. Ladbrokes, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. 40, ¶¶ 3–10 (describing the legal and factual 
context of the dispute involving Ladbrokes and De Lotto). 
167. Betfair, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. 41, ¶¶ 10–20 (summarizing the dispute between 
the Dutch De Lotto and the British Betfair gambling operator). 
168. Ladbrokes, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. 40, ¶ 16 (concluding that a monopoly regime 
constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide services); see Betfair, [2010] 3 
C.M.L.R. 41, ¶ 24 (emphasizing that monopoly legislation is commonly found to 
restrict free provision of services). 
2014] A BUSTED FLUSH 1567 
cultural factors, to restrict gambling on the grounds of public 
policy.169  
Further, in Ladbrokes the CJEU again faced the question of 
whether it is consistent for national authorities to employ an 
expansionist policy in gambling operations while pursuing the 
objective of crime prevention and reduction of gambling within 
the Member State.170 Here, the CJEU found that authorized 
operators must be able to present a “reliable” and “attractive” 
service in order to draw consumers away from illegal activity, 
and therefore, controlled expansion of gambling operations can 
be consistent with the Member State’s objectives.171 However, 
the CJEU found it difficult to reconcile an expansionist policy 
with the objective of protecting consumers and left this question 
for the national court to determine. 172  Again, the Second 
Chamber stressed the unique risks posed by online gambling, 
and found the regulations proportionate to and justified by the 
overriding objectives of crime and fraud prevention.173 
In July 2010, the Fourth Chamber also issued a preliminary 
ruling on gambling regulations in Sjöberg & Gerdin.174 In Sjöberg 
& Gerdin, newspaper editors advertising in Sweden for online 
gambling operators were found to be acting in violation of 
Swedish law and were fined SEK 50,000 kr (approximately 
US$6541).175 The CJEU found the restriction on advertising 
                                                                                                             
169. Ladbrokes, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. 40, ¶¶ 17–20 (allowing restrictions on the free 
provision of services in light of overriding reasons in the public interest); see Betfair, 
[2010] 3 C.M.L.R. 41, ¶¶ 26-29 (justifying restrictions on the grounds of public policy, 
public security, or public health). 
170. Ladbrokes, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. 40, ¶¶ 23–25 (citing the referring courts own 
doubts regarding the consistency of an expansionist gambling policy with the objectives 
on the record). 
171. Id. ¶ 25 (holding that controlled expansion is justified when the expansion is 
aimed at channeling gambling activity to regulated rather than clandestine operators). 
172. Id. ¶¶ 26–38 (leaving the issue of consistency to the national court to 
determine). 
173. Id. ¶¶ 54–58 (noting the different liabilities posed by the online gambling 
market sector and finding that in light of these differences, the contested restriction is 
justified); see Betfair, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. 41, ¶¶ 33–37, 60–62 (deferring to national 
courts and legislatures regarding online gambling regulations due to the unique risks 
posed by the activity). 
174. Sjöberg & Gerdin, [2010] E.C.R. I-6921. 
175. Id. ¶¶ 19–23 (describing the contested events in the main proceedings). 
According to the Swedish court, the Swedish legislation sought to “counter criminal 
activity; counter negative social and economic effects; safeguard consumer protection 
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necessary and justified because it was only ensuring that 
consumers gamble within the authorized Swedish system.176 The 
CJEU admonished the Swedish legislature for inconsistently 
fining advertisers of unlicensed services more than the Swedish 
operators.177 Here, the Fourth Chamber did not engage in an 
analysis of the regulation’s proportionality or discriminatory 
character, but rather left the matter to the national court to 
determine.178 
The CJEU here retreated from the vigorous analysis 
employed in Gambelli, citing the unique risks posed by online 
gambling.179  These rulings marked a return to the lenient, 
hands-off approach taken in earlier rulings like Schindler and 
Läärä, and deferred much of the analysis to the national 
courts. 180   Moreover, the CJEU did not engage in a 
proportionality analysis in Sjöberg & Gerdin.181  These rulings 
were less faithful to the goals of the fundamental freedoms and 
the internal market. 
                                                                                                             
interests, [and] apply the profits from lotteries to objectives which are in the public 
interest or socially beneficial.” Id. ¶ 5. 
176. Id. ¶¶ 33–34, 39, 45 (stating that the restriction on the freedom to provide 
services in the Kingdom of Sweden and advertising is justified as it furthers the 
legislature’s objective of channeling gambling to regulated operators). 
177. Id. ¶ 56 (chastising the Swedish legislature for potentially fining advertisers 
of Swedish gambling activities less than advertisers of gambling in other Member 
States). 
178. Id. ¶¶ 55–57 (deeming the issue best left to the referring court to determine 
if the regulations at hand are evenhanded and proportionate). 
179. See Santa Casa, [2009] E.C.R. I-7633, ¶¶ 69–70 (rejecting the application of 
mutual recognition in the face of the risks posed by online gambling to consumers); see 
also Ladbrokes, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. 40, ¶¶ 54–58 (concluding that the different risks 
posed by online gambling justify the restriction); Betfair, [2010] 3 C.M.L.R. 41, ¶¶ 33–
37, 60–62 (allowing restriction on the free provision of services in light of the risks of 
online gambling). 
180. See SPORTS BETTING, supra note 2, at 29 (analyzing the Betfair, Ladbrokes, and 
Sjöberg & Gerdin decisions to confirm dicta in Santa Casa, a case that “delivered a 
significant blow to the private gaming sector,” regarding monopolies and other 
restrictive policies in the Netherlands and Sweden); see also Verbeke, supra note 130, at 
254 (calling the Santa Casa ruling a pendulum swing back to Schindler that has a low 
burden of proof, ignores conflicts of interest, and too readily accepts the Portuguese 
government’s argument); Doukas, supra note 60, at 244 (characterizing the CJEU as 
“generally reluctant to engage in a rigorous review of the compatibility of national 
licensing systems with the Treaty” and deferential to national courts). 
181. Sjöberg & Gerdin, [2010] E.C.R. I-6921, ¶¶ 55–57 (leaving the determination 
of nondiscrimination and proportionality to the national court entirely). 
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III. NATIONAL REGULATION OF ONLINE GAMBLING SHOULD 
FOLD IN FAVOR OF EU-WIDE REGULATION 
Online gambling is uniquely extraterritorial in that national 
borders are virtually nonexistent on the Internet. Thus, online 
gambling escapes regulation and enforcement more easily than 
conventional gambling.182 The differing national regulations of 
the Member States have created legal uncertainty that many 
online gambling operators have exploited through operations in 
the grey market.183 Moreover, the online gambling market in the 
European Union is rapidly growing at a rate of fifteen percent 
and is broadly unregulated with roughly eighty-five percent of 
online gambling websites unlicensed as of 2006.184 Thus, crime 
prevention and consumer protection objectives, especially 
protection of minors, are not being accomplished in the 
regulation of online gambling. 
First, the European Union must harmonize the differing 
national regulations to properly combat the social risks 
associated with online gambling. Online gambling is a 
borderless activity, which calls for borderless solutions. Second, 
the CJEU must continue to pursue infringement proceedings 
brought by the Commission and to rigorously examine the 
compatibility of national regulations on gambling with the 
Treaty principles. The thorough analysis employed in Gambelli-
Placanica and revitalized by Carmen Media is a more appropriate 
compatibility analysis than the highly deferential test used in 
Santa Casa. 185  Moreover, the CJEU should continue on the 
recent line of reasoning carried out in Stanleybet and encourage 
Member States to either drastically reform the monopoly systems 
                                                                                                             
182 . See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text (discussing the legal 
uncertainty surrounding gambling regulation and the illegal market that has grown out 
of said uncertainty). 
183. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (estimating that in 2006 eighty-five 
percent of active gambling websites operated without a license). 
184. See supra notes 13–14, 22, 25 and accompanying text (estimating that the 
online market currently grows at a rate of fifteen percent, that eighty-five percent of 
operating websites were unlicensed in 2006, and outlining the lack of online gambling 
specific regulation but citing a number of electronic commerce regulations that affect 
the online gambling market). 
185. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (affirming that Gambelli-Placanica 
symbolized a movement towards a stricter analysis); see also supra note 155 and 
accompanying text (describing the shockwave that Santa Casa sent across the 
jurisprudence). 
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or consider the consumer benefits of liberal licensing systems.186 
The conflicting and inharmonious national regulations on 
online gambling clearly are not achieving their stated objectives 
of consumer protection and crime prevention.187 The European 
Union needs to tackle the problem from a different angle—a 
harmonized angle. 
A. Minimum Harmonization in Online Gambling is Needed 
Online gambling calls for legislative solutions. The 
European Union’s legislative institutions should continue their 
current dialogue and fulfill the objectives laid out in recent 
communications and resolutions. 188  The reopening of 
infringement proceedings against Member States whose 
regulations unduly restrict free trade in the gambling market is a 
step in the right direction.189 Regulation of online gambling 
should be harmonized at the Community level, or at a minimum 
common security standards should be crafted to protect against 
online gambling by vulnerable consumers and minors. 
Minimum harmonization that sets the floor for online gambling 
regulation across the Union could better achieve consumer 
protection by creating EU-wide age minimums and identity 
checks. 190  This is an especially attractive option because 
gambling regulation implicates so many social and moral policy 
issues.191 Member States would be free to legislate above the 
minimum standards and could become useful as policy labs.192 
                                                                                                             
186. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (describing the implicit policy 
recommendation the CJEU made in Stanleybet). 
187. See supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text (outlining the legal uncertainty 
in the market and the number of online gambling websites operating without a 
license). 
188. See supra notes 63–73 and accompanying text (summarizing briefly recent 
Parliament and Commission steps taken in the field of online gambling regulation). 
189. See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text (regarding the 2013 decision 
for the Commission to reopen infringement proceedings). 
190. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text (explaining the differing 
degrees of harmonization and the potential applicability of minimum harmonization to 
the field of gambling regulation). 
191. See supra notes 15–22 and accompanying text (describing the social risks 
traditionally associated with gambling, specifically via the Internet). 
192. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (giving an example of Member 
States acting as policy labs in the environmental field). 
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In the meantime, the CJEU should reconsider its explicit 
rejection of the application of mutual recognition in gambling 
regulation. The application of the principle of mutual 
recognition could lead the way to EU-wide regulation. Mutual 
recognition guarantees market access across the European 
Union despite differing national regulations. 193  Due to the 
political sensitivity of the issue and the large tax revenues at 
stake, application of the principle may be difficult to achieve—
especially considering the fact that many Member States do not 
want to increase competition in and availability of gambling 
services.194  
B. The CJEU Must Remain Committed to the Fundamental Freedoms 
and Employ a Probing Analysis of National Restrictions on Gambling 
Services 
Until harmonization is politically feasible, the CJEU should 
consistently apply the compatibility analysis it currently employs 
to guarantee that the restrictions on the fundamental freedoms 
are justified.195 The inconsistent approach the CJEU has taken in 
examining gambling regulations to date has perpetuated and 
perhaps invited the existing fragmentation and legal uncertainty 
in the online gambling market. 196  Recently, the CJEU has 
returned to a compatibility analysis that demands 
proportionality and fully examines the national legislature’s 
proposed justifications. 197  The CJEU must continue to 
emphasize the importance of consistency and proportionality in 
regulation. It is important that the CJEU continue to examine 
the national legislatures’ objectives, as it did in Gambelli and 
                                                                                                             
193. See supra notes 52–55 and accompanying text (discussing the principle of 
mutual recognition, the equivalence it creates in the law, and the debate over applying 
the principle to the field of gambling regulation). 
194. See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text (criticizing the application of 
mutual recognition in the gambling market). 
195. See generally supra notes 105–08, 129–34, 152–54 (discussing the compatibility 
analysis employed in Gambelli-Placanica and revitalized in Carmen Media). 
196. See generally supra notes 24–26 and accompanying text (referring to the legal 
uncertainty in the online gambling market). 
197 . See supra notes 98–128 and accompanying text (detailing the trend 
beginning in 2010 in the CJEU of employing searching and thorough analyses in 
reviewing the compatibility of gambling regulations with the Treaty). 
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Placanica, as economic protectionism can never serve as a 
justification for restricting free trade.198 
The CJEU should also continue to require support on the 
legislative record that criminal activity or deterrence of 
consumer addiction is significant enough to warrant strict 
regulation as it did in Dickinger & Ömer and Zeturf.199 Even if 
there are findings that support the stated objectives, the CJEU 
must insist that the regulations are proportionate to, and 
consistent with, these findings. The cloak of protective objectives 
is often used as a pretense to support the economic benefits of 
monopoly or licensing regulatory schemes actually pursued, as 
seen in Dickinger & Ömer, Gambelli, Placanica, and, most recently, 
Pfleger.200 As always, the CJEU must not allow discrimination on 
the basis of national origin or place of establishment, as it 
reaffirmed in Costa & Cifone and Engelmann.201 
Moreover, in Stanleybet the CJEU recently advocated for the 
more liberal licensing permit scheme over the monopoly model 
of regulation.202 This policy stance is a remarkable change from 
Carmen Media, which was itself a landmark case that supported 
liberalization of the market, where the CJEU stated that a 
monopoly could be found suitable and necessary. 203  The 
language in Stanleybet is stronger, and the CJEU makes a policy 
recommendation to the Greek legislature either to reform the 
current monopoly system or to recognize that a liberalized 
licensing system may better protect consumers against addiction 
and fraud.204 If all the Member States employed a licensing 
                                                                                                             
198. See supra notes 132–54 and accompanying text (summarizing the series of 
cases, beginning with Gambelli, that more closely examined the national legislature’s 
objectives than in Schindler or Santa Casa). 
199. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (calling for legislative support for 
restrictive measures imposed on gambling in the cases Dickinger & Ömer and Zeturf). 
200. See supra notes 115–16, 127, 136–37, 148 and accompanying text (citing cases 
where the CJEU found or should find inconsistency in the stated ends and the 
employed means: Dickinger & Ömer, Pfleger, Gambelli, and Placanica). 
201 . See supra notes 109, 112–13 and accompanying text (re-establishing 
vigorously that regulations may not discriminate on the basis of nationality). 
202. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (briefly summarizing the CJEU’s 
implicit policy recommendation in Stanleybet). 
203. See supra notes 105–06 and accompanying text (finding that a monopoly in 
Germany potentially could be found suitable and consistent). 
204. See supra notes 123–25 and accompanying text (recommending that the 
Greek government either overhaul the monopoly system or liberalize). 
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permit scheme, then mutual recognition could more effectively 
apply. Furthermore, the CJEU could find online gambling is 
sufficiently distinguishable from conventional gaming to warrant 
a separate judicial analysis that acknowledges the inherent cross-
border nature of the activity. 
If the European Union continues to leave the analysis of 
online gambling regulations that restrict free trade to the CJEU, 
then the CJEU must carefully police these regulations to prevent 
economic balkanization and maintain market access. To this 
end, the CJEU should continue to engage in a thorough analysis 
of proportionality and consistency when examining the means 
and the ends of Member States’ online gambling regulation. 
CONCLUSION 
The current unregulated state of online gambling in the 
European Union and the web of conflicting regulations in the 
Member States actively contributes to the confusion, potentially 
allowing operations by unscrupulous operators. Moreover, these 
unregulated websites create undesirable risk to minors and 
individuals with gambling addictions. Ultimately, a system of EU-
wide regulation is the most appropriate solution to issues in a 
market that spans the European Union. Until such a system can 
be achieved, the CJEU should continue to insist on a thorough 
analysis of Member States’ regulations by evaluating the 
proportionality and non-discriminatory nature of such 
regulations. Member States should also heed the CJEU’s 
decision in Stanleybet: either overhaul monopoly systems or 
liberalize the market by instating a licensing system. 
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